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Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being, the
exact nature of our defects.
Alcoholics Anonymous, Fifth Step
THOMAS J. REED*
INTRODUCTION
Two homicide trials have threatened the integrity of Alcohol-
ics Anonymous and other self-help groups that follow the Twelve
Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous. In 1990, a Bangor, Maine jury
convicted Ronald Boobar, Jr. of the murder of fourteen year old
Becky Pelky. Boobar, an alcoholic, had attended Alcoholics
Anonymous (hereinafter "AA") meetings before Pelky's Novem-
ber 1988 death. Shortly after her death, Boobar, while on the
way to an AA meeting in the company of Joseph Sapiel, recalled
being with "Becky" at the time she was killed. Boobar was sub-
sequently arrested for the murder of Becky Pelky and was vis-
ited in jail by Daniel DesIsles, an AA member to whom he made
admissions about the Pelky killing. Both DesIsles and Sapiel
were called as State's witnesses and were compelled to disclose
Boobar's conversations.'
In New York, Paul Cox, a White Plains carpenter and AA
member, was indicted in 1993 for murdering two physicians.
The indictment was based in part upon a report made by a fellow
AA member to the White Plains Police Department. Six AA
members were called as witnesses in Cox's June 1994 trial to
B.A. Marquette University, J.D., Notre Dame Law School, Professor of Law,
Widener University School of Law, Wilmington, Delaware. I owe a debt to Professor
Donald E. Pease, who read this Article in manuscript and made many useful sug-
gestions to improve it.
State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162, 1168-69 (Me. 1994).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
testify under compulsion to confidential communications Cox
made to them.2 Cox's first trial ended in June 1994 with a hung
jury. He was retried in November 1994 and convicted of first de-
gree manslaughter.3
In both cases, defense counsel moved to suppress confiden-
tial communications made by the defendants to other AA mem-
bers. The courts, however, refused to find a confidential com-
munications privilege for conversations between AA members.
This Article examines the Boobar and the Cox decisions in light
of the law defining compulsory disclosure of confidential com-
munications in group therapy. Following an analysis of the cur-
rent state of the law, this Article investigates the effect of the
constitutional right to privacy as it applies to group therapy. Fi-
nally, this Article proposes that confidential communications be-
tween Twelve Step group members are constitutionally protected
and should be shielded by a judicially-enforced privilege.
I. THE SETTING
A. State v. Boobar
In November 1988, Ronald Boobar, an alcoholic and drug
addict, and Thomas Dembowsky, a friend of Boobar, picked up
three teenage girls in a Bangor, Maine bar.4 One of the three was
fourteen year old Rebecca "Becky" Pelky. Boobar, Dembowsky,
and the three girls left the bar and cruised the town in Boobar's
car. Early the next morning, Boobar dropped Dembowsky and
two of the girls off at their homes. Dembowsky, the last passen-
ger to be let off, remembered that Boobar and Pelky drove off to-
gether. The next day, Becky Pelky's mother reported her daugh-
ter missing.
On November 9, 1988, two pedestrians found Becky Pelky's
body lying in the woods in Hermon, Maine.5 A medical examiner
determined that she had been strangled with a nylon rope about
2 See Joseph Berger, Alcoholic Said He Killed, Colleagues Testify, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 1994, at B; Jan Hoffman, Faith in Confidentiality of Therapy Is Shaken,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1994, at Al; Retrial Begins in Murder Case Tied to Confession
to A.A. Group, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at B7.
3 Joseph Berger, Carpenter Guilty of Manslaughter in 1988 Slayings in Larch-
mont, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at B1.
4 Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1164-65.
Id. at 1164.
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five to ten days before her body was discovered.6 The Maine
State Police learned that Boobar had been the last person who
had contact with Rebecca Pelky before her death.7 Shortly after
her body was discovered, the police went to Boobar's house to
take him in for interrogation. During a four hour interrogation,
Boobar denied killing Pelky and insisted he had dropped her off
at her mother's house on the night in question.' Nevertheless,
the police detained Boobar for the grand jury; he was thereafter
indicted for Pelky's murder.9
In the fall of 1988, Ronald Boobar was attempting to recover
from alcohol and drug addictions. 10 Nine days after Becky
Pelky's body was discovered, he went to an AA meeting with Jo-
seph Sapiel, a fellow member."1 Boobar told Sapiel that the State
Police believed he murdered Becky Pelky. Boobar admitted that
he had been with Becky Pelky the night she died, but claimed to
have been helping her with her addiction problems and an un-
wanted pregnancy.' This conversation occurred before Boobar
was taken into custody; it is unclear whether this exchange took
place in Sapiel's car before the meeting, or during the AA meet-
ing itself.
Boobar also contacted AA during his pretrial detention. 3
Daniel DesIsles, an AA member, was a volunteer group leader
for the county jail. At Boobar's request, DesIsles met with Boo-
bar in the lockup, where Boobar admitted that he had been out
with Becky and had an argument with her after dropping off all
the other passengers.'4 DesIsles tried to discourage Boobar from
talking about the crime, but Boobar persisted, eventually telling
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1165. One of the three girls later identified Boobar as their host for the
night.
n Id. at 1165.
9 Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1165. Boobar was held without bail in the county jail. Id.
Two fellow inmates later testified that Boobar had made damaging admissions to
them concerning Becky Pelky's death. Inmate Charles Kimball, Jr. testified that he
overheard Boobar talking on the telephone stating that "I didn't mean to do it. I just
kind of, like, blacked out. I was drunk and stuff." Id. Inmate Richard Everett, Jr.
also testified that Boobar admitted killing Pelky to Everett and another inmate.
'0 Id. at 1165. He had attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings before the Pelky
killing. Id.
" Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1168.
'2 Id. at 1168-69.
13 Id. at 1169.
'4 Id. at 1169 & n.6.
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DesIsles, "You and one other person know that I did it."'5 Boo-
bar's attorney made a pretrial motion to suppress Boobar's
statements to fellow AA members on the grounds of psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. 6 The trial judge denied the motion.
The State presented strong circumstantial demonstrative
evidence linking Boobar to the scene of the crime. Paint traces
found embedded in a fir tree near the crime scene matched paint
on Boobar's dented side view mirror and vegetative matter found
on the mirror proved compatible with the fir tree. 7 Moreover,
two pubic hairs found on the victim matched Boobar's hair under
microscopic examination." In addition, the testimony of Dem-
bowsky and of one of Pelky's companions demonstrated that
Boobar was the last person seen with Becky before her death.
The State called Daniel DesIsles as a witness who gave the fol-
lowing testimony:
Well, he was giving me-telling me different stuff in between,
you know, and I was trying to say about the Twelve Step pro-
gram. And, at the end, he looked at me and he said, 'You and
one other person know that I did it.' And, then, at the end when
I was walking out, he said, 'I did it."9
Boobar's counsel objected to the admissibility of this testi-
mony on three grounds. First, the conversation was privileged
under Rule 503 of the Maine Rules of Evidence as a confidential
communication made in the course of psychotherapeutic treat-
ment. Second, 42 U.S.C. §290dd-3 requires that communications
between prisoners and therapists in federally funded substance
abuse programs be held confidential. Third, the probative value
of the statements made to DesIsles was substantially out-
weighed by the prejudice to the defendant."
Joseph Sapiel, also called as a witness for the State, testified
15 Id.
16 State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162, 1169 (Me. 1994). Rule 503 of the Maine Rules
of Evidence rests in the patient the privilege to prevent disclosure at trial of com-
munications to a physician or psychotherapist. ME. R. EviD. 503.
'7 Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1166. The police cut down the fir tree with the paint
samples. Id. Using the tire tracks found at the crime scene, the fir tree was re-
constructed at the original site for an experiment. Id. Boobar's car was brought to
the scene and positioned in the tracks. This demonstration showed that the dented
mirror lined up with the gouge mark in the tree. Id.
"Id. at 1168.
' Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1169 n.6. DesIsles also testified that Boobar did not spe-
cifically indicate what "it" was. Id.
20 Id. at 1169.
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to the conversation he had with Boobar on the way to the AA
meeting.2 Boobar objected to Sapiel's testimony on two of the
grounds raised in the objection to DesIsles's evidence: the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege and the prejudicial effect pursuant
to Rule 403 of the Maine Rules of Evidence.22
Nevertheless, Boobar was convicted of murder. Defense
counsel asserted several grounds for reversing his conviction,
including, inter alia, the assertion that the court erred in admit-
ting DesIsles's and Sapiel's testimony.23 Boobar claimed that his
statements to DesIsles at the county jail were intended to be
confidential: the statements pertained to his drug and alcohol
addiction problems and DesIsles was functioning as a drug and
alcohol counselor when he received those statements. Boobar
argued that exchanges between therapist and patient at a fed-
erally-funded drug and alcohol treatment program privileged
communications.24 The court, however, rejected this argument
21 Id. at 1168-69.
22 Id. at 1169.
23 Boobar claimed three other grounds for reversal. First, Boobar claimed that
he did not freely and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before giving a statement
to the Maine State Police. The court, holding that Boobar's statement to the police
was properly admitted because it was not coerced, noted that Boobar had three cof-
fee breaks and went to the bathroom before giving a statement. Additionally, the
interrogating officers testified Boobar was advised of his rights before they asked
any questions. State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162, 1165-66 (Me. 1994). Second, Boobar
claimed the out-of-court demonstration staged by the Maine State Police at the
scene of the crime-using Boobar's car and a section of fir tree to show that the dent
on Boobar's rear view mirror corresponded to the height of the gash on the tree-
was inadmissible because it was not substantially similar to the known facts of the
Pelky homicide. Boobar contended that the demonstration preserved on videotape
for the court, .was more prejudicial than probative and could not be the basis for ex-
pert testimony. The court rejected this claim of error because the demonstration
was substantially similar to the known facts surrounding Pelky's death. Id. at 1167-
68. Boobar also objected to admission of expert testimony that footprints found on
the exterior of Boobar's car resembled footprints on the victim's neck and admission
of microscopic slides of wood and leaf fragments made by the State's expert for the
purpose of identifying the vegetation found in the dent on Boobar's car, and admis-
sion of the damaged mirror and the segment of fir tree with the gash used in the out
of court demonstration. These items of evidence were collateral to the admissibility
of the demonstration and were held to be within the trial judge's discretion. Id. at
1167. Third, Boobar claimed the forensic evidence introduced by the State showing
that Becky Pelky had sexual intercourse at some time shortly before her death un-
duly prejudiced him because the evidence suggested he had committed statutory
rape. The court rejected this assertion finding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. Id. at 1168.
24 Id. at 1169. The Public Health Service Act provides for the confidentiality of
treatment in connection with a program relating to substance abuse treatment con-
1996]
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indicating that since the jail where the conversation occurred
was not receiving federal assistance for drug and alcohol abuse
treatment, the defense privilege claims could not be sustained.25
The court examined Boobar's argument based on the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. Rule 503 of the Maine Rules of Evi-
dence provides a broadly-based privilege for confidential com-
munications between psychotherapists and patients. The
privilege applies to exchanges between therapists and patients,
patients and other patients, and patients and family members
participating in group psychotherapy. Boobar's attorney argued
that communications between AA members were protected by
Rule 503. Rather than claim Boobar had a constitutionally-
based right to keep his AA communications privileged under the
right to privacy, she attempted to stretch Maine's psychothera-
pist-patient privilege rule to include communications between
AA members. She argued that the Maine legislature intended to
bring self-help groups within the definition of "psychotherapy" by
allowing peer groups to perform psychotherapeutic counseling
without a license." However, the court rejected this analogy be-
cause AA was not a legally recognized professionally-supervised
group therapy program. The court found that professional su-
pervision of group therapy sessions was critical to the applica-
tion of psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court therefore
upheld Boobar's conviction and compulsory disclosure of confi-
dential communications between AA members.27
B. People v. Cox
Early on the morning of January 1, 1989, the bodies of Dr.
Shanta Chervu and her husband Dr. Lakshman Rao Chervu
were discovered in their Larchmont, New York home. An in-
truder had entered their house and attacked the couple in their
beds, killing the two with repeated stab wounds after what ap-
ducted by any department or agency of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a)
(1994).
2' Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1169. The court also stated, in dicta, that the statute did
not establish an evidentiary privilege because it provided for a civil fine in case of a
violation. Id.
26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13856(1) (West 1995). Boobar's counsel also ar-
gued that ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13856(b) (West 1995), granted a privilege to
communications made to licensed psychotherapists, and a similar provision for li-
censed social workers, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7005 (West 1995), extended by
analogy to self-help groups. Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1169.
27 Boobar, 637 A.2d at 1169-70.
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peared to be a protracted struggle. There were no forensic clues
identifying the attacker, and the Chervus' murder case went un-
solved until 1993.28
In May 1993, Larchmont police received a tip that the perpe-
trator was Paul Cox, a carpenter who had lived in the house
owned by Dr. Chervu from 1967 to 1974. Although the identity
of the informant was not officially disclosed, it later became ap-
parent that the person reporting Cox's admissions was a fellow
member of AA.29 According to the confidential source, Cox had
become intoxicated after drinking with friends at a bar on New
Year's Eve. On his way home, Cox wrecked his car and fled on
foot toward the house in Larchmont where he had lived as a boy.
The informant alleged that Cox broke into the house and killed
the Chervus with a kitchen knife. Based on this information, the
Larchmont police matched otherwise unidentified fingerprints in
the house to Cox. He was arrested and indicted on two counts of
murder." As a result, the Westchester District Attorney's office
indicated an intent to subpoena AA members who had conversa-
tions with Cox after the 1989 incident in which Cox admitted to
the break in and homicides. Cox's attorney tried unsuccessfully
to suppress the witnesses' statements as confidential communi-
cations.31
At Cox's trial in June 1994, the People called six AA mem-
bers, who had received confidential communications from Cox
regarding a possible homicide committed during an alcohol in-
duced "blackout" on New Year's Eve 1988, to testify. One wit-
ness32 testified that Cox told her he believed he had murdered a
man and woman in a bedroom once used by his parents. The
witness testified that Cox told her, "I don't remember this night,
I don't know what happened. I don't know what went on. But I
might have done it."33 Another AA member testified that Cox
told him "he had gone to a house and that he killed two people
2' Berger, supra note 2, at B5.
2"Id. atB1.
" Id. at B1.
31 Id. at B1, B5. Cox pled insanity, alleging that he murdered the Chervus in a
psychotic outburst triggered by his over-consumption of alcohol prior to the homi-
cide. Id. at B5.
32 Berger, supra note 2, at B1. All six AA members testified under alias to pro-
tect their anonymity. Id.
"3 Id. at B1. Cox also told the witness, who was a former girl friend, that he
found a bloody knife in his possession after the homicides and threw it into Long
Island Sound. Id. at B5.
1996]
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while they slept."34
Cox's first trial ended in a hung jury, eleven voting for con-
viction and one for acquittal. 5 A second trial started November
2, 1994.36 The same six AA members repeated their testimony to
a new jury. Cox testified on his own behalf, relating his history
as an alcoholic. According to Cox, he had abused alcohol since
the sixth grade in response to his perceived indifference of his
parents and six siblings. 7 Cox also recounted his heavy drinking
in high school including secret stashes of vodka in his car for
mid-morning drinks."8 Cox stated he had no memory of the
Chervus' slayings39 but did admit to drinking five or six pitchers
of kamikazes on New Year's Eve 1988, before wrecking his car.'
At the close of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the
jury that it could find Cox guilty of first degree murder, or they
could find him guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaugh-
ter, if they believed that Cox had acted under extreme emotional
distress at the time of the homicides.4 The jury subsequently
found Cox guilty of manslaughter.42
These two cases are the first recorded instances in which the
prosecution obtained incriminating evidence from AA members
under compulsory process. In each case, AA members gave evi-
dence against the accused that was crucial to the State's case in
chief. If the State invaded a constitutionally protected right to
personal privacy by using the accused's admissions made in the
course of AA meetings or after-meetings discussions, then the
Boobar and the Cox courts committed errors of constitutional
dimensions that justify reversal.43
Id. at B5.
3" Joseph Berger, Mistrial Declared in Case of Suspect in 2 Murders, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1994, at B5.
"6 See Retrial Begins in Murder Case Tied to Confession to AA Group, supra
note 2, at B7.
" Suspect Says Mind Blank on Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, at 29.
38 Id. Cox testified that a psychiatrist had diagnosed him as a person who suf-
fered from fantasies centering on killing his parents. Debra West, Accused's Words
at Core of Insanity Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, at 58.
" Suspect Says Mind Blank on Slayings, supra note 37, at 29; No Memory of
Stabbings, Carpenter Tells Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1994, at B5.
40 West, supra note 38, at 58.
" Jury Weighs Charges in Carpenter Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994,
at B6. The jury was also given a not guilty by reason of insanity instruction.
42 See Berger, supra note 2, at B1.
4' This comment holds true even though the Rebecca Pelky homicide was a
gruesome heinous crime as was the homicide that took the lives of Drs. Chevru and
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This Article reviews the history of the Twelve Step program
and its place in the rehabilitation of alcoholics and drug addicts.
It then examines the case for a judicially-recognized privilege for
confidential communications made by members of Twelve Step
recovery groups to other group members in the course of a recov-
ery program. Ultimately, the only justification for recognizing
such a privilege is the constitutionally-rooted right to personal
privacy, the primary basis for the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege and the privilege extended to confidential communications
between clergy and congregation members.
II. HISTORY OF TWELVE STEP ORGANIZATIONS
A. Precursors of Alcoholics Anonymous
The movement to curb excessive use of alcohol in the United
States dates back to the late eighteenth century." Prior to that
time, beer, whiskey, rum, and brandy were omni-present at
home and in the work place.45 There were probably a significant
number of people who fit the modern definition of alcoholics, per-
sons unable to control their urge to drink,46 but the social conse-
Chevru. The fact that it may have been expedient for the prosecution to use confi-
dential communications against the accused, who may not have been convicted on
the strength of other evidence, does not justify admission.
MARK EDWARD LENDER & JAMES KIRBY MARTIN, DRINKING IN AMERICA, A
HISTORY 34-40 (1982) (paralleling America's movement to reduce drinking with
America's movement toward independence and resulting rebirth of "public virtue").
45 Id. at 9-21. Colicky babies were given whiskey or rum in their milk or mush to
calm them down. No gang of house carpenters could put up a barn or a house with-
out a cask of spirits to shore up their strengthL During the American Revolution,
Continental Army and Navy enlisted men received a daily grog ration of a gill of wa-
tered down rum in order to inspire their military courage. JAMES S. BLOCKER,
AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENTS: CYCLE OF REFORM 4-7 (1989); LENDER &
MARTIN, supra note 44, at 31-32.
'6 The definition of an alcoholic according to Alcoholics Anonymous is a person
who is powerless to control the urge to drink Alcoholics Anonymous literature still
considers alcoholics to be persons who are allergic to alcohol. See, e.g., ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS, THE STORY OF How MANY THOUSANDS OF MEN AND WOMEN HAVE
RECOVERED FROM: ALCOHOLISM xxiii-xxx (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter ALCOHOLICS
ANONYM:Ous]. They follow the medical theory originated by Dr. William Silkworth,
M.D., the director of Charles B. Townes Hospital in New York City between 1924
and 1934. Townes Hospital was one of the very few institutions that would accept
chronic alcoholics as patients before World War II. Silkworth taught his patients
that alcoholism is an allergic reaction brought on by genetic predisposition to react
adversely to alcohol. He also impressed upon them the need for total abstinence
from any form of alcohol. ERNEST KURTZ, AA, THE STORY 21-24 (2d ed. 1988). Wil-
liam Wilson, one of the original founders of Alcoholics Anonymous, had been Dr.
1996]
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quences of alcoholism in a pre-industrial society were much less
serious than in a highly complex post-industrial environment
such as the late twentieth century United States. In general,
eighteenth century North American colonists and their early
United States descendants were heavy drinkers who were often
intoxicated. Society tolerated widespread alcohol abuse, save for
the pioneer Methodists who pledged to abstain from ardent spir-
its on religious and social grounds.'
All this changed when Dr. Benjamin Rush, the first United
States physician to write on mental illness, released An Inquiry
into the Effects of Ardent Spirits on the Human Mind and Body
in 1784.48 Since 1772, Dr. Rush had campaigned against hard
liquor on the ground that spirits were dangerous to human men-
tal and physical health. Inquiry described alcohol addiction or
chronic drunkenness as an addictive disease passing through
progressively more acute phases or stages resulting in death or
insanity. 9 Although Rush did not oppose moderate use of wine
or beer, he opposed any use of whiskey, rum or brandy. Drunk-
enness was not simply a moral vice that could be overcome by
will power, according to Rush, but an addictive condition beyond
human control." Dr. Rush was appalled by the social cost of
drunkenness already apparent in the post-revolutionary United
States: crime, degradation, broken families, and economic loss.
He feared that political control of the republic would pass to
politicians who were supported by whiskey drinking intoxicated
voters. 1 Dr. Rush's views were highly unpopular in his time, but
his treatise served as the basis for later nineteenth century tem-
perance reform movements. One hundred fifty years later, AA
would adopt Dr. Rush's original description of alcoholism as an
addictive disease.
Dr. Rush founded no societies to curb drunkenness. Al-
Silkworth's patient at Townes during the early 1930s. Modem medical theory does
not support the notion that alcoholism is an allergic reaction. Alcohol addiction is a
complex and baffling condition. Thanks to the work of Dr. Ernest Jellinek and the
Yale (later Rutgers) Center of Alcohol Studies, most researchers accept the premise
that alcoholism is a physical and mental disease or illness. LENDER & MARTIN, su-
pra note 44, at 186-88.
41 LENDER & MARTIN, supra note 44, at 34-36.
4 Dr. Rush was a signer of the Declaration of Independence and the Surgeon
General of the Continental Army. Id. at 36.
49 See id. at 37.
50 See id. at 36-38.
5' See id. at 38; see also BLOCKER, supra note 45, at 7-8.
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though some Methodist and Baptist ministers advocated absti-
nence from hard liquor, it took sixty years for any organized ef-
fort to put Dr. Rush's principles into practice. In the mid-19th
century, the Washingtonians and the Sons of Temperance were
true historical precursors of AA.52
In the late 1830s six Baltimore skilled tradesmen were
drinking in a local tavern. They sent one worker to a local tem-
perance meeting who came back from the meeting burning with
desire to form a brotherhood that would provide mutual support
for drinkers who wanted to stop drinking. 3 The Baltimore sup-
port group developed a unique program for mutual support: each
member would be required to tell his or her own story relating to
drinking problems as a "testimonial" in support of complete ab-
stinence from all forms of alcohol. These testimonials would be
directed toward prospective new members as a missionary de-
vice, and by Christmas 1840 the Baltimore group had dispatched
missionaries to New York and Cincinnati to spread the goods
news.5 The early Washingtonians, primarily recruited from
working class heavy drinkers, spread their total abstinence mes-
sage with surprising rapidity and effectiveness throughout the
settled parts of the United States, establishing local societies for
men and a women's auxiliary-the Martha Washingtons.
Typically, a visiting Washingtonian missionary would arrive
in a community and rent a hall for a temperance lecture in which
the missionary would describe with excruciating detail his own
course as a heavy drinker. The missionary would then recount
how he had been saved from death or insanity by the Washing-
tonians. He described the mutual support from others who had
taken the total abstinence pledge and promised to support each
52 This Article will not attempt to summarize the history of coercive temperance
reform and reformers such as Neal Dow and those responsible for the Anti-Saloon
League, since the political drive to ban liquor sales does not relate to the objectives
of Alcoholics Anonymous in any way. Alcoholics Anonymous decided early in its his-
tory not to become involved in partisan political fights over drug and alcohol sales.
Its stance is embodied in the Sixth and Tenth Traditions of the program: "6. An AA
group ought never endorse, finance or lend the AA name to any related facility or
outside enterprise, lest problems of money, property and prestige divert us from our
primary purpose. 10. Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues."
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 564.
5 BLOCKER, supra note 45, at 40-41. This occurred during the worst part of the
Panic of 1837 where the usual high rates of alcohol consumption dramatically in-
creased due to widespread unemployment.
54 Id. at 40-41.
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other financially and emotionally through what a later genera-
tion would call "recovery." Then the missionary called for those
willing to start a local society. Usually the audience would re-
spond with a wave of enthusiasm and a local society would be
formed.55 The new converts were invited to schedule weekly
support meetings and members pledged to seek out other heavy
drinkers to help them gain sobriety. Washingtonians combined
support meetings with social gatherings such as picnics and
group singing to provide a replacement social life for tavern fre-
quenters.
Washingtonian groups had no internal or external structure,
and no national association. Each organization functioned on its
own with only fellowship ties to similar groups in nearby com-
munities. The movement lasted less than ten years and al-
though it was immensely successful at first, the Washingtonians
clashed with politically-minded temperance reformers who
wanted local option laws. As they had no spiritual basis for their
movement, the Washingtonians were frequently reviled by or-
thodox temperance advocates for being irreligious. Finally, the
loose organizational structure of autonomous groups with no in-
ternal controls on members' behavior led to two ultimately fatal
wounds. First, some Washingtonians would backslide and begin
drinking heavily. Since the society's membership was not a se-
cret, the Washingtonians thus got a reputation for failure. Sec-
ond, the Washingtonians had to compete with other better organ-
ized lodges for membership support.6 Ultimately, many sober
former Washingtonians became involved in the Sons of Temper-
ance and other similar lodges that provided an institutional
structure in which members systematically paid dues that sup-
ported the lodge's outreach work by funding the missionary work
of the lodge.57
Id. at 40-43.
"Id. at 48-50. Blocker also claims that the Washingtonian movement was in
part a response to the economic crisis brought on by the Panic of 1837, and as eco-
nomic conditions improved in the mid to late 1840s, labor unions reasserted them-
selves as protectors of the working class, causing Washingtonians to abandon the
temperance crusade for labor union assurances of mutual support. This argument is
not logically compelling nor supported by much evidence.
57 BLOCKER, supra note 45, at 48-49. Members also purchased burial insurance
for themselves and their families to financially support the lodge. Id. at 40-41; see
also LENDER & MARTIN, supra note 44, at 77-78 (noting that those interested in
saving alcoholics joined more formal lodges such as Sons of Temperance, advancing
point of view of secret society dedicated to mutual support). Lender and Martin also
[Vol. 70:693
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The Sons of Temperance learned from the mistakes of the
Washingtonians. Membership rolls were secret and new mem-
bers were admitted by vote of the whole lodge. Five negative
votes would exclude a new member. A rival temperance lodge,
the Independent Order of Good Templars, founded in 1851,
emulated the Sons of Temperance with regard to membership
secrecy and membership by sponsorship, but deviated from the
Sons of Temperance model by admitting women on an equal ba-
sis with men. 8
Alcoholics Anonymous would later adopt some of the leading
principles of the temperance societies. It adopted the Washing-
tonian method of personal testimonials from heavy drinkers as
an important means of recruiting members and building group
solidarity. 9 It also adopted the Washingtonian's emphasis on to-
tal abstinence from all forms of alcohol, and its missionary activ-
ism, searching out alcoholics and talking them into attending
meetings.' Alcoholics Anonymous borrowed membership secrecy
from the lodges, realizing that anonymity would protect the or-
ganization from adverse publicity if a member relapsed into
heavy drinking.6 It also admitted men and women on an equal
footing.
Although nineteenth century temperance movement history
explains some of the organizational measures adopted by AA, it
does not explain its unique spiritual basis, since the Washingto-
nians and the Sons of Temperance were entirely secular move-
ments that had no religious affiliation. Alcoholics Anonymous
had its primary roots and in fact grew directly out of a twentieth
century phenomenon, Moral Re-Armament."2
Frank Buchman, a Lutheran minister, founded the Oxford
argue that the primary cause of the Washingtonian downfall was the Withdrawal of
support from churches and other temperance societies, due to disagreements over
leadership and strategies regarding prohibition. See LENDER & MARTIN, supra note
44, at 76.
53 BLOCKER, supra note 45, at 49-51; see also LENDER & MARTIN, supra note 44,
at 78.
5 See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 89-95; LENDER & MARTIN,
supra note 44, at 183.
"' See Bill Wilson, The Three Legacies of Alcoholics Anonymous: Recovery, Unity,
Service, in ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE 49, 139 (Alcoholics Anonymous
World Services, Inc. ed., 1957) [hereinafter ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF
AGE].
", See BLOCKER, supra note 45, at 50-51.
2 See NAN ROBERTSON, GETTING BETTER: INSIDE ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 58
(1988).
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Groups and, later, Moral Re-Armament." Pastor Buchman ex-
perienced a spiritual conversion during a vacation in the British
Isles.' His personal conversion experience was the intuition
that God could become real to anyone willing to believe. Men
distance themselves from God through their own fault, as a re-
sult of moral compromise. Buchman found it necessary to re-
examine his life against four absolute standards: honesty, purity,
unselfishness and love,65 and to first change his own moral life
before he sought change in the moral life of society.66 That
change would be precipitated by sharing his moral failings with
others, i.e., by public confessions. 7
Buchman believed that he was attempting to live as the
TOM DRIBERG, THE MYSTERY OF MORAL RE-ARMAMENT 11-12 (1965); Alan
Thornhill, Frank Buchman, in REMAKING THE WORLD: THE SPEECHES OF FRANK
N.D. BUCHMAN ix, xi (1961) [hereinafter BUCHMAN]. In 1938, Dr. Buchman prepared
a plan for "moral re-armament," a world-wide movement to revitalize social virtue
using the principles of the Oxford Group. The organization took the name "Moral
Re-Armament" and its United States groups participated in the war effort by gal-
vanizing support for the allies. J. GORDON MELTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD
RELIGIONS 1022 (4th ed. 1993).
"MELTON, supra note 63, at 1022. Pastor Buchman had been in charge of a
poor Philadelphia parish and had started a youth hostel for underprivileged boys.
He became embroiled in a battle with his trustees who removed him from his posi-
tion as director. The fight with his board left him exhausted and depressed, and he
went on a tour of the British Isles in 1908. In a chapel, Buchman experienced a
spiritual conversion that freed him from resentment and hostility resulting from the
failure of the youth hostel. Id.; see also BILL PITTMAN, AA THE WAY IT BEGAN 114-15
(1988). Buchman described the experience as follows:
I had entered the little church with a divided will, nursing pride, selfish-
ness, ill-will, which prevented me from functioning as a Christian Minister
should. The woman's simple talk personalized the Cross for me that day,
and suddenly I had a poignant vision of the Crucified ... [ilt produced in me
a vibrant feeling, as though a strong current of life had suddenly been
poured into me, and afterwards a dazed sense of great spiritual shake-up.
There was no longer the feeling of a divided will, no sense of calculation
and argument, of oppression and helplessness; a wave of strong emotion
following the will to surrender, rose up within me from the depths of an es-
tranged spiritual life, and seemed to lift my soul from its anchorage of
selfishness....
Id. at 114-15 (quoting ROBERT H. MURRAY, GROUP MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE
AGES 306 (1935)).
"' These are the four absolute standards of Moral Re-Armament. See BUCHMAN,
supra note 63, at 96.
" KURTZ, supra note 46, at 51; see BUCHMAN, supra note 63, at 24 ("[I]f you
want an answer for the world today, the best place to start is with yourself.").
6' PrITMAN, supra note 64, at 117. Buchman publicly confessed to the first Ox-
ford Group house party held in the summer of 1918 that he had been involved in a
dishonest transaction with a railroad company and had written a letter to the com-
pany admitting his sin together with full monetary restitution.
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early Christians had. He understood that he was to share his
conversion experience with others in order to influence the di-
rection of social and political life.68 Buchman organized the First
Century Christian Fellowship, later called the Oxford Group,69
consisting of those men and women who accepted the moral re-
examination of life according to the four absolutes."
The Oxford Group had no formal organization. Group
meetings were called "house parties" and were held in members'
houses or in hotels. The house parties promoted group sharing
of experience, strength and hope for a moral regeneration, i.e.,
confessions and messages of support for each member. 1 Oxford
Groups operated under six basic assumptions which played a
significant role in formulating the program of AA:
" REV. CLAIR M. DINGER, MORAL RE-ARMAMENT, A STUDY OF ITS TECHNICAL
AND RELIGIOUS NATURE IN THE LIGHT OF CATHOLIC TEACHING 27-29 (1961).
69 PITTMAN, supra note 64, at 117. Some of the earliest adherents to the First
Century Christian Fellowship happened to be Oxford University students, which led
to Buchman groups being nicknamed "Oxford Groups." A First Century Christian
Fellowship Group was also started at Princeton University in the 1920s. Outraged
university administrators ordered the group off the campus because of the alleged
embarrassment engendered by sharing sins at meetings. A commission appointed by
the President of Princeton investigated the fellowship and gave it a clean bill of
health, and the Fellowship was later admitted to the campus with the President's
blessings. MELTON, supra note 63, at 1022.
"' See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also DINGER, supra note 68, at
7, 61-63.
" For an explanation of the house party method of operation, see PITTMAN, su-
pra note 64, at 117, 124-26. The first house party was held in the summer of 1918 in
Kuling, China. A house party was a well organized event in which as many as 200
locally prominent people might be invited to a local hotel, resort or large private
house for anywhere from a long weekend up to one or two weeks. The house party
was managed by a team of Group people who were composed of local members and
members from out of town who would relate their own personal testimonials of con-
version to the spiritual life. Each day of the house party was organized around per-
sonal confessions or witnessing, bible study, informal group discussion and meals.
Team members organized each day during the "quiet time" for meditation for the
invitees each morning. The entire house party was informally arranged and con-
ducted. During the marathon period, invitees invariably would become uncomfort-
able even though no pressure would be put on them to surrender to Christ. Even-
tually, many would make their own witnessing and surrender to Christ before the
group or in small sessions.
Oxford Groups also held "open meetings" in which people who were not special
invitees were permitted to attend a witnessing session. The meeting would be con-
ducted by a team of anywhere from six to sixty group members who would relate
their personal experiences to the audience. Supported by other group members, the
open meeting was a way of reaching converts. To this day, Alcoholics Anonymous
holds both "open" and "closed" meetings on the same plan as the Oxford Group.
ROBERTSON, supra note 62, at 122-23.
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(1) men are sinners;
(2) men can be changed;
(3) confession is a prerequisite to change;
(4) the changed soul has direct access to God;
(5) the Age of Miracles has returned; and
72(6) those who have been changed must change others.
The assumptions described the path to a personal experience
of conversion based on acceptance of Christ. Ultimately the Ox-
ford Groups sought to change others, particularly celebrities and
powerful persons, in order to change the world through personal
evangelical action. In 1938, Dr. Buchman prepared a plan for
"moral re-armament," a world-wide movement to revitalize social
life using the principles of the Oxford Group. The organization
took the name "Moral Re-Armament."
B. Alcoholics Anonymous
The relationship between the Oxford Group and AA goes
back to 1934. In fact according to AA tradition, there are four
founding moments that gave life to the program:
(1) Rowland Hazard's conversation with Dr. Carl C. Jung relat-
ing to religious conversion as a cure for alcoholism;
(2) Ebby Thatcher's November 1934 visit to Bill Wilson, intro-
ducing Wilson to the Oxford Groups;
(3) Bill Wilson's conversion experience in December 1934; and
(4) Bill Wilson's meeting with Dr. Bob Smith in June 1935. 73
Rowland Hazard, a Rhode Island investment banker and al-
coholic, had gone to Zurich in 1930 to place himself under the
care of Dr. Carl C. Jung, hoping that psychoanalysis would cure
his desire to drink. Although Hazard spent more than a year of
therapy, his craving to drink had not subsided and he went on a
binge immediately after release from Jung's clinic. Hazard and
Dr. Jung then had a conversation about sobriety. Jung told him
72 KURTZ, supra note 46, at 49. The six basic assumptions of the Oxford Groups
were the antecedents of the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous. See Bill W.'s de-
scription of the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous in ALCOHOLICs ANONYMOUS,
supra note 46, at 58-103, and the original 1938 version of the steps reprinted in
PITrMAN, supra note 64, at 199.
73 KURTZ, supra note 46, at 33.
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that he had observed that some alcoholics had become sober
through a religious conversion experience. In order to have such
an experience, Jung said, Hazard would have to admit his gen-
eral powerlessness over people, places and things, and place
himself in the care of God. 4 Hazard joined an Oxford Group, ex-
perienced his own powerlessness and became sober. He also re-
cruited Ebby Thatcher into the Calvary Oxford Group where
Thatcher found sobriety.75
In November 1934, William Wilson,76 an alcoholic who later
co-founded AA, received a visit from Thatcher, a friend from prep
school days. Thatcher explained the Oxford Group's principles of
reliance on a higher power, confession and inventory of individ-
ual defects character, and helping others to find a conversion ex-
perience. He convinced Wilson to attend an Oxford Group
meeting in New York City.77 This led to a final hospitalization
for Wilson during which he experienced what he referred to as a
"hot flash" of spiritual conversion." Wilson became a regular
member of the Calvery Oxford Group after his discharge from
the hospital.79 The Oxford Group's insistence on the four abso-
lutes and the six principles of spiritual growth provided a life
guide for alcoholics such as Wilson which would keep them so-
ber."0
" Baz Edmerdes, Alcoholics Anonymous Celebrates Its 50th Year, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, July 1985, at 70.
75 PITTMAN, supra note 64, at 155. Thatcher was an alcoholic who was consid-
ered hopelessly ill and condemned to death or insanity. The Oxford Group reached
out to him, however, and took him to meetings where Thatcher experienced a spiri-
tual conversion which removed the craving for alcohol from his life. ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMiOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note 60, at 58-59.
" At the time, Wilson was out of work, depressed, and dependent on his wife's
income for survival. He had become addicted to alcohol in the 1920s and had fre-
quently been hospitalized for his addiction. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF
AGE, supra note 60, at 52-58.
77Id. at 58-59. The Oxford Group meetings were led by the Reverend Sam
Shomaker, the United States Coordinator for Oxford Groups, at Calvary Church in
New York City. See KURTZ, supra note 46, at 16-18; PITTMAN, supra note 64, at 151.
78 PrITTAN, supra note 64, at 153. At first Wilson, drying out in a hospital in
New York City, thought he was going insane until Dr. William Silkworth, the hospi-
tal's psychiatrist, assured him that some people were able to renounce alcoholism as
a result of a spiritual event or conversion. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF
AGE, supra note 60, at 63.
79 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note 60, at 64. Wilson also
acquired a copy of William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience which Wil-
son poured over searching for his new-found state of mind and spirit. See KURTZ,
supra note 46, at 20-21; PITTMAN, supra note 64, at 154.
80 See ROBERTSON, supra note 62, at 59. The Oxford Group's evangelism could
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Early in 1935, Wilson started to recruit alcoholics for the
Calvary Oxford Group. He also turned his house into a hostel for
alcoholics, hoping to help them achieve sobriety and to learn
more about the condition.8' He was unable to persuade any of
his house guests to stop drinking by using the usual Oxford
Group techniques, i.e., preaching and reliance on the four abso-
lutes."2 Meanwhile, Wilson, who had been unemployed for more
than two years, got a job in a proxy fight that required him to go
to Akron to solicit proxies from shareholders in the spring of
1935.83
During the trip to Akron, Wilson had to stave off a panic at-
tack and the urge to drink." Wilson called Henrietta Sieberling
from the local Oxford Group who had been working to sober up
Dr. Robert H. Smith, an Akron surgeon with a very serious
drinking problem. Sieberling arranged a meeting between Dr.
Smith and Wilson85 during which each told the other the story of
their alcoholism." After the meeting both men determined to
be turned toward redeemed alcoholics, a plan Wilson conceived after sobriety.
PiTrMAN, supra note 64, at 155; ROBERTSON, supra note 62, at 45. Eventually, Wil-
son and his group of recovering alcoholics disaffiliated themselves from Rev. Shoe-
maker's Oxford Group, and established a separate identity as Alcoholics Anony-
mous, following the distilled essence of the Oxford Group's way of life as part of its
recovery program. Id. at 66; ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note
60, at 74-76.
81 See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note 60, at 73-74.
82 See id. 75 (noting difficulties were faced when trying to use Oxford Group
methods with recovering alcoholics).
"See id. at 65-66.
"See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note 60, at 65-66. Wilson
had become depressed over the proxy fight and separation from his wife Lois on
Mother's Day, and strongly felt the urge to drink. Id. He knew that the only way to
stay out of the hotel bar would be to find another alcoholic who needed conversion
by s~initual experience. Id.
Id. at 66-67; KURTZ, supra note 46, at 27-28.
86 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note 60, at 67-70; KURTZ, su-
pra note 46, at 29-31. Wilson and Smith spent the day in a private conversation in
the Sieberling house. Wilson told Smith about his drinking to overcome feelings of
separation and anxiety and loss of control over drinking, how it ruined his life and
marriage, and about his spiritual experience that led to sobriety. For the first time,
Smith heard someone who knew what it was like to be an alcoholic and who had
passed through a gate out of the illness of alcoholism into a new life. Wilson did not
preach nor did he give advice; he simply told Smith his story. Wilson admitted to
Smith that he needed another alcoholic to tell his story to or he would have picked
up a drink in the hotel bar. Wilson thanked him and got up to leave. However,
Smith, overwhelmed by Wilson's honesty and his story, stopped him and began to
open himself up to this stranger from New York. Smith told Wilson about his slide
into alcoholism from experimenting with liquor in college through medical school
into using false names to obtain medicinal alcohol during Prohibition. KURTZ, supra
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continue to use the Oxford Groups. In June 1935, Dr. Smith and
Wilson agreed to work together to find other alcoholics, tell them
their own stories, and bring them into local Oxford Groups. This
marked the actual beginnings of AA.'
The program for alcoholics, as yet a fellowship without a
name or a separate identity, had four core beliefs:
(1) acknowledging personal powerlessness over alcohol, people,
places and things;
(2) as a result, the alcoholic's own understanding of the alco-
holic's ability to control himself and others was deflated, i.e., the
alcoholic "hit bottom";
(3) necessity of conversion-turning the alcoholic's life and will
over to a power greater than the alcoholic as a result of hitting
bottom and admitting powerlessness; and
(4) turning from a life involving oneself and drinking at its cen-
ter to a life of sobriety, meaning fully human interaction with
others.8
By 1938, the group started by Smith and Wilson had already
become a separate organization.89 Bill Wilson undertook to put
down the principles of the alcoholics' program in writing, putting
note 46, at 29-31. Smith decided to invite Wilson into his own home and intensively
work the Oxford Group's absolutes and principles together with Wilson to achieve
sobriety.
After two weeks of intensive group living, Dr. Smith went to Atlantic City to
the AMA convention and came home drunk. Wilson and Dr. Smith's wife Anne, took
him home from the railroad station where Dr. Smith's nurse had found him, put him
to bed and started sobering him up. Smith was scheduled to perform an important
operation in three days. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note 60, at
70-71. By the morning of the third day, he was well enough to do the procedure.
Overcoming his fear, he went through with surgery and came away determined to
live the Oxford Group principles in his own life, and to bring the message to other
alcoholics. Id. at 32-33, 70-71.
17 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note 60, at 71-74.
"' KURTZ, supra note 46, at 34-35. Kurtz explained this core as an admission
that the alcoholic was not God and could not control people, places and things at
will. Instead, the alcoholic acknowledged that something else was God and that
something else was what many people chose to call God. These core beliefs were in
part derived from William James, from the Oxford Groups, and from Dr. Jung's con-
versation with Rowland Hazard.
'3 ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, supra note 60, at 74. The alcoholics
were deterred from membership in the larger group because of its aggressive evan-
gelistic Protestant Christianity. Id. Wilson, in particular, feared that no Roman
Catholic could participate in the program because the Roman Catholic Church ap-
peared to be about to ban membership in Oxford Groups. Finally, the Oxford groups
had a high level of visibility and used celebrities as members in order to attract new
membership. Id. at 75.
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together chapters on the program, interspersed with the individ-
ual stories of group members." By 1939 the alcoholics had cho-
sen a name for their groups: Alcoholics Anonymous. The AA
program adopted two principles that differentiated it from the
Oxford Group: personal anonymity and steadfast refusal to take
any stand on public issues."
The first, edition of Alcoholics Anonymous contained the
twelve principles of the program which Bill Wilson suggested
that all fellowship members should follow in order to gain sobri-
ety-the "Twelve Steps to Sobriety."92 The Twelve Steps ac-
knowledged the fellowship's debt to the Oxford Group, Dr. Jung,
and William James, but had a new and distinctive flavor unique
to AA."3 Alcoholics Anonymous, and all other programs that
have received permission to use AA's Twelve Steps as the basis
for their program, highly recommend that members make moral
evaluations of their conduct and confess their wrongdoing to
The result, a 1,200 page manuscript thinned down to 400 pages by a profes-
sional editor, was printed and released in 1939.
91 KURTz, supra note 46, at 68-77.
92ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 59.
9' The Twelve Steps have been in the same form since 1939. They are:
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol-that our lives had become
unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to
sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as
we understood Him.
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact na-
ture of our wrongs.
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make
amends to them all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do
so would injure them or others.
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong
promptly admitted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious con-
tact with God as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His
will for us and the power to carry that out.
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried
to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all
our affairs.
Id. at 59-60. See generally TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS (Alcoholics
Anonymous World Services, Inc. ed. 1981) [hereinafter TWELVE STEPS]. Following
these steps is known as "working the program" among AA members.
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God, to themselves, and to another human being. Each year
thousands of Twelve Step Group members take the Fourth and
Fifth Steps, inventorying their wrongs and confessing them to
other members. 4 These confessions take place in meetings, or
more often outside of a regular meeting in a one on one session
with another member.95
In 1950, Wilson prepared the final version of organizational
policy principles for AA known as the Twelve Traditions. The
Twelve Traditions were not designed to guide individual efforts
to attain sobriety, but to promote the welfare of AA itself." They
embodied the guiding principles of anonymity for all fellowship
members and abstention from public political or social issues.97
94 These actions, derived from the Oxford Group, are made concrete in AA's
Fourth and Fifth Steps. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 59; see also
TWELVE STEPS, supra note 93, at 42-63 (discussing Fourth and Fifth steps in detail).
"5 See TWELVE STEPS, supra note 93, at 60-61 (suggesting AA members may
choose to confess their wrongs to sponsor).
9' See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 563 ("The '12 Traditions' of
Alcoholics Anonymous are, we A.A.'s believe, the best answers that our experience
has yet given to those urgent questions, 'How can A.A. best fimction?' and, 'How can
A.A. best stay whole and so survive?'").
97 The current version of the Twelve Traditions are:
1. Our common welfare should come first; personal recovery depends upon
A.A. unity.
2. For our group purpose there is but one ultimate authority-a loving God
as He may express Himself in our group conscience. Our leaders are but
trusted servants; they do not govern.
3. The only requirement for A.A. membership is a desire to stop drinking.
4. Each group should be autonomous except in matters affecting other
groups or A.A. as a whole.
5. Each group has but one primary purpose-to carry its message to the al-
coholic who still suffers.
6. An A.A. group ought never endorse, finance or lend the A.A. name to any
related facility or outside enterprise, lest problems of money, property and
prestige divert us from our primary purpose.
7. Every A.A. group ought to be fully self-supporting, declining outside con-
tributions.
8. Alcoholics Anonymous should remain forever nonprofessional, but our
service centers may employ special workers.
9. A.A. as such, ought never be organized; but we may create service
boards or committees directly responsible to those they serve.
10. Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence the A.A.
name ought never be drawn into public controversy.
11. Our public relations policy is based on attraction rather than promo-
tion; we need always maintain personal anonymity at the level of press,
radio, television and films.
12. Anonymity is the spiritual foundation of all our Traditions, ever re-
minding us to place principles before personalities.
Id. at 564; see also TWELVE STEPS, supra note 93, at 129-189 (examining Twelve
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According to AA General Services, as of 1987 the AA fellow-
ship consisted of more than 73,000 autonomous AA groups with
more than 1,500,000 members." AA membership continues to
grow world-wide. In the past decade, the criminal justice system
has taken notice of AA by imposing mandatory attendance at AA
meetings for persons convicted of alcohol related offenses, such
as driving under the influence.99 This use of AA has made it an
integral part of the larger state administered system of rehabili-
tation for offenders.
The AA program rests on a shared basis of principles that
requires absolute confidentiality between members, or the pro-
gram would fail. The Fourth Step, "searching and fearless moral
inventory," is a means for the group's members to derive an ac-
curate self-assessment.' The Fifth Step confession of wrongdo-
ing is a spiritual and psychological necessity for personal growth
out of addiction into a serene and whole life.' If all of a mem-
ber's wrongdoings, as identified and confessed to other members
could be discovered by compulsory legal process, the risk in-
volved in taking the Fifth Step would be too great for most indi-
viduals to accept. If AA is to function effectively, it must do so as
originally intended-anonymously and confidentially. Before the
confidentiality of Twelve Step Groups' communications can be
recognized legally, however, the relative benefit of such pro-
grams must be weighed against the social cost to the litigation
process.
C. The Social Value of Alcoholics Anonymous and Other Twelve
Step Groups
According to the Utilitarian calculus applied to confidential
Traditions in depth).
"KURTZ, supra note 46, at 172.
See Sean P. Murphy, Alternative Sentence Program Models Prisoners; Many
States Study Connecticut's Work Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1994, at 13
(explaining Connecticut program requiring offenders on probation attend Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings); Sean P. Murphy, Lynn Company to Run Md. County's Pro-
gram for Drunk Drivers, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 7, 1994, at 74 (detailing Maryland
alternative sentencing program requiring substance abuse offenders attend Alcohol-
ics Anonymous or other counseling meetings); see also Elisabeth Wells-Parker,
Mandated Treatment; Lessons from Research with Drinking and Driving Offenders,
ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD, Sept. 22, 1994, at 302-06 (studying effectiveness
of mandatory alcohol treatment programs).
'0" See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 64-71; TWELVE STEPS, supra
note 93, at 42-55.101 See ALcOHOLIcs ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 72-75.
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communications privileges claims in other areas, if confidential
communications between AA members and among members of
other Twelve Step Groups are to enjoy legally protected confi-
dentiality, then the activities of these groups must be socially
valuable."2 It is useful to look at the social policy values sup-
ported by other confidential communications privileges in order
to understand this rationale.
The attorney-client privilege, the only confidential communi-
cation privileged universally recognized at common law, was in
part the product of rules that made parties to litigation and
those interested in the outcome incompetent to testify.0 3 It also
reflected recognition of the social value of absolute confidential-
ity between attorney and client."° The courts justify the exis-
tence of this privilege based on Utilitarian calculus and the belief
that it is more important to society's good as a whole to promote
free exchange of communications between attorney and client
than it is to compel discovery.0 5 While this policy assumption
has not been tested under controlled experimental conditions, it
reflects the accumulated historical wisdom of the profession col-
lected in anecdotal fashion over several centuries.' The rela-
tionship between attorney and client requires special protection
from compulsory disclosure if it is to operate effectively.1 7 Based
on his understanding of the attorney client privilege, Dean Wig-
more derived four general conditions for the judicial creation of a
confidential communication which new confidential communica-
tions privileges must meet in order to withstand judicial scru-
112 For an extended discussion of the traditional Utilitarian justification for
privileged communications, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals:
Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980). See also MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 72, at 171 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3rd ed. 1984) [hereinafter
McComiCKJ (explaining utilitarian justification for privilege).
103 Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 603 n.13. For a detailed history of the historical
underpinnings of the attorney client privilege, see 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290
(3rd ed. 1940) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE].
104 See Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 605-09 (demonstrating chilling effect on cli-
ent communication due to theoretical absence of privilege).
105 See MCCORMICK, supra note 102, § 72; WIGMIORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note
103, § 2291; see also Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 604 (stating that key modern
purpose of privilege is to promote communication between attorney and client).
0 See David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges
in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112 (1956) (The theory that this
privilege is necessary to ensure that the attorney gets all essential information, in-
evitably rests ultimately on sheer speculation.").
10? See generally MCCORMICi supra note 102.
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These criteria have been applied judicially to recognize other
confidential communications privileges which have not been es-
tablished by legislation."9 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not
specifically provide for any confidential communication privi-
leges.1 The attorney-client privilege is recognized by federal
courts because of its origins in the common law before the for-
mation of the United States.' The husband-wife privilege also
has been recognized, protecting confidential communications
made between spouses and preventing compulsory disclosure of
facts learned during marriage." Other confidential communi-
cations privileges have not been judicially recognized, although
state statutes and court rules have recognized them.'
108 Wigmore's four essential criteria for judicial establishment of a confidential
relationship privileges are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed[;]
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfac-
tory maintenance of the relation between the parties[;]
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community to be
sedulously fostered[; and]
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, at § 2285. Of course, the legislature may
pass statutes granting confidential communications privileges to professionals
which the courts must follow, even if they fail to meet Wigmore's criteria.
109 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383-84 (3d Cir. 1990)
(applying Wigmore's four tests to clergy-communicant privilege); In re D.D.S., 869
P.2d 160, 164 (Alaska 1994) (applying Wigmore's test to confidentiality of alcohol
treatment records).
110 Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, gov-
ernment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a wit-
ness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
. See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that attorney-
client privilege is necessary "in the interest and administration of justice"); United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
2 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) (noting that spousal
privilege is firmly established).
. See, e.g., WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 2380 (physician-patient
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
however, has recognized a confidential communication privilege
for psychotherapists and patients based upon the Utilitarian cal-
culus."4  In In re Zuniga, two Michigan psychiatrists received
subpoenae duces tecum to testify before a federal grand jury in-
vestigating medical insurance fraud."5  The subpeonae in-
structed them to bring their client files and billing records to the
hearing."6  The two psychiatrists resisted disclosure of the
names, addresses, and diagnoses of their patients, claiming that
such information was privileged due to the confidential relation-
ship of psychotherapist and patient." After the district court
denied their motion to quash the subpoenae, they appealed to
the Sixth Circuit."8 Although prior attempts to assert a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege had not been successful,"' the
Sixth Circuit recognized that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence enables it to establish new common law privilege
rules." The court took judicial notice of Report No. 45 for the
Advancement of Psychiatry,' and granted the privilege, recog-
nizing the significance of confidentiality in psychotherapy and its
necessity in effective treatment of mental diseases or disor-
privilege); 26 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE § 5427 (1980) (accountant-client privilege); id. § 5429
(social worker privilege); id. § 5431 (nurses, probation officers and stenographers
privilege).
14 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983).
1s Id. at 634.
11 Id.
U? Id. at 634-35.
U Id. at 636.
U See United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 n.9 (11th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Witt,
542 F. Supp. 696, 699 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 525 (N.D. Cal. 1981). But see Ramer v. United States, 411
F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir. 1969) (assuming that psychotherapist-patient privilege is en-
forceable); Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 578-79 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (limited privi-
lege recognized).
,20 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 637 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
48 (1980)) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge the authority of the federal
courts to continue the evolutionary development of the testimonial privilege in fed-
eral criminal trials 'governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted ... in light of reason and experience.'").
Id. at 638 (quoting Advisory Committee Note °to Proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973)). The Note stated that "confidentiality is the
sine qua non for successful treatment." Id. at 639 (quoting the Note, 56 F.R.D. 183,
242).
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ders"' The court also recognized that most states have adopted
rules or statutes granting a privilege to confidential communica-
tions between patient and psychotherapist.'23 The court further
recognized that mental illness may interfere with a citizen's
ability to participate in the political process, and the privilege
therefore furthered public policy goals. 1" Weighing these inter-
ests against the tribunal's interest in discovering information,
the court concluded that communications intended to be confi-
dential between psychotherapist and patient were privileged.
The court, however, permitted disclosure of the patient's identity
and length of treatment noting that such information generally
is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.'
Zuniga demonstrates that courts can establish new privi-
leged communications rules when Dean Wigmore's four prereq-
uisites are satisfied. Alcoholics Anonymous can be subjected to
the same type of judicial scrutiny to determine whether confi-
dential communications made by members should be shielded
from compulsory disclosure. Although utilitarian calculus is an
uncertain basis for any major social policy rule excluding other-
wise relevant and reliable evidence, unlike other sources for such
rules, it is widely accepted by lawyers, judges, and scholarly lit-
erature.
Any proponent of the establishment of a new rule creating a
privilege for confidential communications between AA members
must answer three questions. First, does AA perform a socially
useful function? Does its program help to sober up alcoholics?
Second, if AA does work, what is the social cost involved in le-
gally recognizing a privilege for confidential communications be-
tween AA members? Finally, does the social benefit of a legally
recognized privilege outweigh the social cost of the privilege?
It is difficult to employ empirical output measurement
techniques to quantify the social value of AA and other Twelve
Step Groups. Alcoholics Anonymous does not publish statistics
on sobriety. The scientific community has no generally accepted
definition of sobriety. There is no simple way of comparing the
12 Id. at 639.
1 Id. at 638-39 & n.3.
'24In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d. at 639. For further argument on why psychothera-
pist-patient privilege serves to protect individual's constitutional rights, see Steven
R. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 27
(1980).
m In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639-40.
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number of alcoholics who come into AA, become sober, and re-
main sober for a specified period of time against those who at-
tend AA meetings and drop out without achieving sobriety. The
scholars who have examined AA's effectiveness in this fashion
have been unable to agree on sufficient common grounds to
permit comparison." However, no scholar contends that AAparticipation is worthless to alcoholics seeking recovery. 7
'6 Alcoholics Anonymous is not an easy organization to evaluate with common
scientific tools. See EDGAR P. NACE, THE TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM 240 (1987)
(noting methodological problems in evaluating AA's effectiveness). First, although
Alcoholics Anonymous World Service reports regularly on meeting attendance, not
every person who goes to an AA meeting is sober. Id. at 241. Second, controlled
studies of AA groups are nearly impossible to achieve because an AA group is
anonymous, and has no structural limitation on membership other than a common
desire to stop drinking. Id. at 242. Third, although compulsory AA meeting atten-
dance is a regular feature of some state-sponsored DUII alternative dispositions, re-
cidivism studies on first time DUI offenders sent to AA under compulsion have not
been completely satisfactory from a scientific point of view. This is because no di-
version programs have seen fit to use a control group of carefully matched first tim-
ers who were not sent to AA. Clinical studies of AA groups have been undertaken,
however, and some scholars report positive results for alcoholics achieving long-
term sobriety from AA participation. See, e.g., GREGORY BATESON, The Cybernetics
of Self. A Theory of Alcoholism, in STEPS TO AN ECOLOGY OF MIND 309, 310 (1972);
NORMAN K DENzIN, THE ALCOHOLIC SOCIETY 62 (1993); G. Edwards, et al., Alcohol-
ics Anonymous, the Anatomy of a Self-Help Group, 1 SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 195 (1967);
Benjamin Kissin, Theory and Practice in the Treatment of Alcoholism in TREATMENT
AND REHABILITATION OF THE CHRONIC ALCOHOLIC 1 (Benjamin Kissen & Henri
Begleiter eds., 1977); Barry Leach & John L. Norris, Factors in the Development of
Alcoholics Anonymous, in TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION OF THE CHRONIC
ALCOHOLIC, supra, at 441; NACE, supra, at 240. However, other scholars have re-
ported little behavioral modification in problem drinkers that can be traced to AA
participation. See, e.g., J.M. BRANDSMA, ET AL., THE OUTPATIENT TREATMENT OF
ALCOHOLISM: A REVIEW AND COMPARATIVE STUDY (1980); Keith S. Ditman, et al., A
Controlled Experiment on the Use of Court Probation for Drunk Arrests, 124 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 160 (1967); Barbara J. Powell, et al., Comparison of Three Outpatient
Treatment Interventions: A Twelve Month Follow-up of Men Alcoholics, 46 J. STUD.
ON ALCOHOL 309 (1985); B. Stimmel, et al., Is Treatment of Alcoholism Effective in
Persons on Methadone Maintenance?, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 862 (1983). The
authors all point to studies that have found no beneficial treatment effect from Al-
coholics Anonymous participation. William R. Miller, however, reports that no sin-
gle form of treatment for alcoholism is necessarily better for every alcoholic. See
William R. Miller, Alcohol Treatment Alternatives: What Works?, in HARVEY B.
MILiKMAN & LLOYD I. SEDERER, TREATMENT CHOICES FOR ALCOHOLISM AND
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 253 (1990) (suspecting all four studies reporting no significant
benefits from working Alcoholics Anonymous program to be methodologically flawed
and suspect).
127 DENZIN, supra note 126, at 51. Denzin believes that Alcoholics Anonymous'
success lies in the group's rejection of Cartesian dualism and the objectivity of the
external and measurable world, and its preference in adopting an intersubjective
and oriental worldview in support of achieving sobriety stating that:
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The clinical community, however, supports AA participation
for in-patient and out-patient treatment regimes for recovering
alcoholics.128 The therapeutic relationship between AA members
depends upon absolute confidentiality.129 It is possible to con-
struct a justification for legal recognition of a privilege to protect
confidentiality based upon Utilitarian calculus. However, Utili-
tarian analysis is an inherently weak way to support a privileged
communication because the balance of forces can shift with pre-
... [ulnlike science in the following critical respects. First the essential
structures of the AA traditions exist and are passed on through an oral
tradition ... AA does not rely on upon the printed page for the transmission
of its knowledge as science does.
Second, unlike science ... AA affirms what it denies proof to, although de-
nying what it rigorously affirms. That is, although arguing that a scientific
proof for the existence of God can never be given, AA proposes a belief in a
power greater than the individual ... It asks individuals to make a leap of
faith and come to believe in a power greater than themselves ....
Similarly, doubting but not denying that recovery from alcoholism can oc-
cur if the 12 steps are not taken, AA strongly urges each individual to fol-
low its suggested steps to recovery. Hence AA affirms what it says cannot
be proven, although denying ... the possibility of what it affirms.
Third, unlike science, which can establish nothing that is not based directly
or indirectly [on records and statistical analysis] AA moves forward with-
out records, regularly kept statistics, or information on whether or not its
methods and assumptions do in fact work.
Fourth, much of modern behavioral science ... builds upon the Cartesian
dualism that posits an objective world that can be studied, interpreted and
controlled by the methods of modern inquiry. Alcoholics Anonymous denies
this dualism. It denies also an objective view of the world, locating the al-
coholic subject, instead, in a world that is intersubjective, noncausal, spiri-
tual, collective, and distinctly oriental, as opposed to western and occiden-
tal.
Id. For example, Dr. Eugene Nace includes AA meeting attendance as part of his
comprehensive therapy program for recovering alcoholics. See NACE, supra note
126, at 162-63 (treatment regime) and 249. Nace's treatment approach is also rec-
ommended by Denzin, a sociologist and research specialist. See DENZIN, supra note
126. Denzin goes even further to state that recovery mandates AA meeting atten-
dance as well as participation in Adult Children of Alcoholics programs. Id. at xvii.
Denzin describes a comprehensive five week treatment program at three rehabili-
tation centers using the first five steps of Alcoholics Anonymous as the basis for
group therapy conducted by licensed counselors. Id. Most of the counselors were
chosen because they had professional credentials and were persons in recovery
themselves who followed the Twelve Steps ofAA. Id. at 211-244.
This principle was recognized by Bill W. who made the following observation
on taking the fourth and fifth steps:
"Rightly and naturally, we think well before we choose the person or per-
sons with whom to take this intimate and confidential step ... It is impor-
tant that he be able to keep a confidence...."
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 74.
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vailing social values. The calculus that once supported a privi-
lege will work against the privilege as social objectives change.
D. Judicial Invasion of Privacy
Judicial inquiry cannot proceed without relevant informa-
tion. Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence succinctly states
that "all relevant evidence is admissible" unless excluded by
some specific exclusionary rule.30 Privileged communication
rules reflect extrinsic social policy decisions made by judges or
legislatures that the court should not invade a person's privacy
to obtain relevant information for an inquiry.1
3 1
Historically, the courts have been unfriendly to a witness'
claims of privilege to resist compulsory disclosure of confidential
communications. 32  Dean Wigmore declared more than eighty
years ago that the courts should not freely grant privileges to
witnesses to not respond to questions.33 Modern case law has
followed Wigmore's policy. Courts seldom recognize new claims
of privilege unless the privilege has been established by the leg-
islature.34
'3 FED. R. EVID. 402.
31 MCCORMIC supra note 102, §§ 72 & 75.
"2 See supra note 102 (discussing traditional utilitarian justification for privi-
leged communications).
M WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 2192. Dean Wigmore states that:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fimdamen-
tal maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has
a right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the various
claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many
derogations from a positive general rule:
From the point of view of society's right to our testimony, it is to be re-
membered that the demand comes, not from any one person or set of per-
sons, but from the community as a whole-from justice as an institution
and from law and order as indispensable elements of civilized life .... It
follows, on the one hand, that all privileges of exemption from this duty are
exceptional ....
Id. (citations omitted).
"4 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (limiting right of non-
witness spouse to claim privilege and prevent spouse's adverse testimony); Bran-
zburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (rejecting news reporter's First Amend-
ment claim of privilege for confidential sources); United States v. Burzynski, 819
F.2d 1301, 1311 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying physician-patient privilege exists in context
of criminal investigation in spite of state law establishing privilege); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 750 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1984) (questioning existence of privilege
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Of course, as Dean Wigmore recognized, this viewpoint sets
the judicial system in conflict with many persons' expectations of
privacy rights."5 Wigmore believed, however, that every citizen
had a duty to present evidence, and that judicial inquiries that
took precedence over all claims of privilege which, if recognized
at all, should be narrowly construed."6 Consequently, the social
obligation to testify nearly always outweighs claims of a person
to respect for the person's privacy.
Most courts follow the four part test given by Dean Wigmore
in evaluating original claims of privilege."' Since Wigmore's test
requires application of utilitarian calculus to the claim of privi-
lege, the balance of forces usually, but not always, favors denial
of a new privilege unless that claim is supported by a statute the
court is obligated to apply. Even then, the court is justified in
construing the statute narrowly.
This judicial attitude seems to be based on the jurispruden-
tial position that individual human persons are inherently social
animals that owe their existence to their society, and have no
greater destiny than to live out their lives within the context of
that society. Therefore, every right an individual may claim
must yield to societal claims of necessity.138 In the context of
compelling testimony, the greatest good for the greatest number
will be derived when claims of privilege are ignored and testi-
for scholarly work); Robinson v. Magovern, 83 F.R.D. 79, 89 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(rejecting claim of privilege for peer review reports); State v. LaRoche, 122 N.H.
231, 233 (1982) (denying extension of doctor-patient privilege to communication
made to an emergency medical technician); People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422, 424-
25 (1979) (denying extension of marital privilege to cohabitants in marriage-like re-
lationship); see also Saltzburg, supra note 102, at 598 (espousing similar views on
judicial reluctance to establish new privileged communications rules).
"' "From the point of view of the duty here predicated, it emphasizes the sacri-
fice which is due from every member of the community .... [Tihe sacrifice may be of
his privacy, of the knowledge which he would preferably keep to himself because of
the disagreeable consequences of disclosure. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note
103, § 2192.
116 "The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty demand
the restriction, not the expansion, of these privileges. They should be recognized
only within the narrowest limits required by principle. Every step beyond these
limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the administration
ofjustice." WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 2192 (citations omitted).
137 MCCORMICK, supra note 102, § 72, n.7 (noting that Dean Wigmore's test, su-
pra note 103, has been particularly influential).
138 Such a presupposition is motivated by classical utilitarianism. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 183-89 (1971) (comparing classical utilitarianism with
impartiality and benevolence principles of justice).
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mony is compelled from a reluctant witness, unless the resulting
harm to other socially valuable relationships resulting from
compulsory testimony is exceptionally great."9
This analysis shows that the foundation for judicial invasion
of personal privacy has been based on an individual's implicit
social duty to testify in judicial inquiries, forcing the person
claiming privilege to demonstrate that the harm resulting from
disclosure to other socially valuable relationships will exceed the
benefits of disclosure. At common law, the claim of privilege was
sustained for the attorney-client and spouses on the sole ground
that disclosure of these confidential communications would de-
stroy the established socially valuable relationship. 4 ' In each in-
stance, judicial policy strongly favored the relationship's contin-
ued existence.
In order to appreciate the apparent judicial disregard of per-
sonal privacy, it is necessary to look at a third privileged rela-
tionship having no common law origin due to its emergence at
the end of the nineteenth century-the relationship between
mental health worker and patient. In the past few decades,
there have been limited situations in which courts have recog-
nized the confidentiality of communications between mental
health workers and patients in the absence of a statute.4 The
"0 See Minnesota v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 132-33 (Minn. 1984). When com-
pulsory testimony is ascertained from group therapy members, the resulting harm
may include the patient's reluctance to divulge information, which would negatively
effect therapy by inhibiting an integral and necessary part of the patient's diagnosis
and treatment. Id. at 134; see also Farrell v. People, 203 Cal. App. 3d 521, 527 (Ct.
App. 1988) (noting presence of each person within group is designed to facilitate pa-
tient's treatment).
' "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisor must be removed; hence
the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent." WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 2291.
The only argument against recognition of the [husband-wife] privilege is based
on the proposition that the fourth condition is not in truth fulfilled-that the occa-
sional compulsory disclosure in court of even the most intimate marital communi-
cations would not in fact affect to any perceptible degree the extent to which
spouses share confidences. Whether this argument is well founded is not, and
probably cannot be, known. However, since the other three conditions are so fully
satisfied and since the compulsory disclosure of marital secrets at least might cast a
cloud upon an essential aspect of the institution of marriage, the present privilege
should be recognized. Id. § 2332.
41 See United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311, 1319-20 (E.D. Wise. 1994)
(federal common law determined existence of privilege concerning statements made
to mental health counselors), affd, 63 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct.
1872 (1996).
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mental health worker-patient relationship is the closest analogy
to the relationship of AA members and is worth considerable re-
view as an analogy to gauge the need for a privilege for AA
members.
III. THE CASE FOR A PRIVILEGE
A. Similar Privileges: Mental Health Worker-Patient Privilege
Two generally recognized privileges-the mental health
worker-patient privilege and the clergy's privilege-resemble the
proposed privilege for Twelve Step programs.
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted
a confidential communications privilege for one or more classes
of mental health workers and their patients." All fifty states
provide confidential communications privileges for psychologists
and patients.' Psychiatrists have a similar confidential com-
munications privilege recognized under broadly drafted statutes
and rules for a psychotherapist-patient privilege and under the
aegis of a statutory physician-patient privilege.'" At least seven
states have a separate confidential communication privilege for
social workers, six have a generic "mental health professional"
privilege covering social workers, nurses and counselors, and five
provide for an explicit marriage counselor's privilege."5 Fur-
142 See infra note 146.
" See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996) (listing psychotherapist
privilege from all fifty states and District of Columbia).
'" See generally WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 2380 (discussing
physician-patient privilege).
'4 The following states have adopted the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
statute or court rule:
Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 34-8A-21 (counselors); 34-26-2 (psychiatrists & psycholo-
gists) (1996). Alaska: ALASKA R. EvID. 504 (psychiatrists & psychotherapist) (West
1996). Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-2291 (medical records); 32-2085
(psychologists); 32-3238 (behavioral health professionals) (1995). Arkansas: ARK
CODE ANN. § 17-97-105 (psychologists) (Michie 1995); ARK. R. EVID. 503 (physician
& psychotherapist). California: CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1010-1027 (psychotherapists)
(West 1995). Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(d) (physicians); (g)
(psychotherapists & social workers) (1996). Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
146(c) (psychologist); (d) (psychiatrists) (1995). Delaware: DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 503
(psychotherapist). District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1996) (physicians
and mental health professionals). Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503
(psychotherapist) (West 1996). Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (psychiatrists &
psychotherapist) (1996). Hawaii: HAW. R. EVID. 504 (physicians); 504.1
(psychologists) (1996). Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 54-2314 (psychologists) (1996); IDAHO R.
EVID. 503 (physician/psychotherapist-patient) (1996). Illinois: 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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thermore, the psychotherapist-patient version of the privilege
has been recognized as a "common law" privilege by one state
15/5 (clinical psychologists); 55/70 (marriage counselor); 60/45 (physicians) (1993);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (physicians); 5/8-802.1 (rape crisis counselors); 8-802.2
(victim assistance counselors) (West 1996). Indiana: IND. CODE §§ 25-33-1-17
(psychologists); 34-1-14-5 (physicians) (1996). Iowa: IOWA CODE § 622.10 (physician
& mental health professional). Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-427
(physician/psychiatrist); 74-5323 (psychologists); 74-5372 (master's level psycholo-
gists) (1995). Kentucky: KY. R. EVID. 506 (counselors); 507 (psychotherapists) (1996).
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3734 (health care providers) (West 1995).
Maine: ME. EVID. R. 503 (physicians & psychotherapists). Maryland: MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 9-109 (psychiatrists & psychologists); 9-109.1
(psychiatric mental health nursing specialist) (1995 & Supp. 1996). Massachusetts:
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (psychotherapists only) (1986 & Supp. 1996).
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 17078 (physician's assistant); 18237
(psychologists); 2157 (physician) (1994). Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(d)
(physicians); (g) (nurses/psychologists); (k) (sexual assault victim counselors) (West
1996). Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 73-30-17 (licensed professional counselors);
73-31-29 (psychologists) (1995). Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 337.540 (professional
counselors); 337.055 (psychologists); 491.060(5) (physician & psychiatrist) (West
1995). Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-805 (physician); 26-1-807 (psychologists)
(1994). Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (physician, psychologist & professional
counselor) (1995). Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.215 (psychiatrist, psychologist,
psychiatric counselor & social worker) (1995). New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 329:26 (physician); 330-A:19 (psychologist) (1995). New Jersey: N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45:8B-29 (marriage counselors); 45:14B-28 (psychologists) (West 1996); N.J.
R. EVIn. 506 (physician); 510 (marriage counselor) (West 1996). New Mexico: N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 504, 561-9-18 (Michie 1995). New York: N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504
(physician/psychiatrist); 4507 (psychotherapist); 4508 (social worker) (McKinney
1992). North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53 (physician); 8-53.3
(psychotherapist); 8-53.5 (marital & family counselor); 53.7 (social worker); 53.8
(counselor) (1996). North Dakota: N.D. R. EVID. 503 (physicians & psychothera-
pists). Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.02(B) (physicians/psychiatrists);
2317.02(G) (guidance counselors & social workers); 2317.02(H) (family mediators);
4732.19 (psychologist) (Banks-Baldwin 1995). Oklahoma: OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
2503 (psychologist) (West 1995). Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 40.230 (psychologist);
40.240 (nurse practitioner); 40.245 (school employee); 40.250 (clinical social worker)
(1995); OR. R. EVID. 504 (psychotherapist); 504(1) (physician/psychiatrist). Pennsyl-
vania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5929 (physicians), 5944 (psychologists) (West
1996). Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-63-17 (marriage counselor & mental health
counselor) (1995). South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (mental health pro-
fessional) (Law Co-op. 1995). Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1-207
(psychiatrist); 63-11-213 (psychologist) (1995). Texas: TEX. R. EVID. 509(b)(1)
(physician/psychiatrist); 510(b) (mental health professional) (1995). Utah: UTAH R.
Evin. 506 (physician & social worker) (1995). Vermont: VT. R. EVID. 503 (physicians
& mental health professionals) (1995). Virginia: VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-399
(physician) (Michie 1995). Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 18.83.110
(psychologist); 18.19.180 (counselors) (West 1995). West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 30-
30-12 (1996) (social worker). Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (physician, nurse
practitioner, chiropractor, psychologist, social worker, marriage therapist, profes-
sional counselor) (West 1995). Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-27-123
(psychologist); 33-38-109 (social worker) (Michie 1995).
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supreme court and three federal circuit courts.14
The protection afforded by the mental health worker-patient
privilege includes protection of statements made for the purposes
of mental treatment or drug rehabilitation. Such communica-
tions are generally recognized by courts as non-compulsory.
Commentators have declared that there was no common law
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and for such a privilege to ex-
ist, it must be granted by the legislature or by a court rule.'47
The American Psychiatric Association advanced a confiden-
tial communications statute for psychotherapists in the 1950s,
which gave birth to the more comprehensive statutes and rules
seen today in nearly all states. 48 Prior to that time, there were
no statutes or court rules authorizing a confidential communica-
tions privilege for the psychotherapeutic process. The privilege
was based on the notion that one-on-one talk therapy between
the psychoanalyst and patient necessarily probed the patient's
deepest inner recesses. ' According to privilege advocates, ex-
posing the patient's subconsciously repressed desires to public
'" Alaska recognized a common-law version of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in 1976. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 418 (Alaska 1976). The Second,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have recognized a common law psychotherapist-patient
privilege. In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,
639 (6th Cir. 1983); Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357 (7th Cir. 1995), afld, 116
S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
147 See MCCORMICK, supra note 102, § 98 (stating that common law did not rec-
ognize physician-patient privilege and departure from this rule occurred in 1828
when New York enacted statute prohibiting physicians from revealing information
disclosed to him by patient); WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 2285 (noting
fundamental conditions to establishment of privilege and denial by common law of
physician-patient privilege rests on assumption that certain conditions are not met);
see also David E. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part II., 41
MINN. L. REV. 731, 737 (1957) (stating that attorney-client privilege existed at
common law while physician-patient privilege did not).
'4 See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 89 (1960) (primary
written vehicle for advancement of confidential communications privilege for psy-
chotherapists).
'49 For a contemporary justification for the psychotherapist-patient privilege
based on a Freudian model of psychotherapy, see Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a
Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 184-94 (1960)
(illustrating need for unique structure and different rules within psychotherapeutic
relationship); Manfred S. Guttmacher & Henry Weihofen, Comment, Privileged
Communications Between Physchiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32, 44 (1952)
(asserting that specific types of physician-patient relationships should be afforded
different treatment and psychiatrist relationship deserves greatest privilege due to
trust and confidence required).
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scrutiny would destroy the therapeutic relationship. 0 Thirty-
five or forty years ago, scholars and judges did not have the
benefit of psychotherapeutic models that employed a cooperative
team effort between psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker,
counselor and nurse that were developed after the Vietnam War.
Consequently, they did not anticipate the need for a comprehen-
sive mental health worker's privilege. Further, they had no idea
that drug and alcohol dependence and abuse would become a
national pandemic after 1965. Consequently, it follows that the
initial psychotherapist-patient privilege rules and statutes did
not include protection for subsidiary workers unless they were
directly employed by and working under supervision of the psy-
chiatrist or psychologist. Nor did the early statutes provide any
protection for confidential communications between group ther-
apy participants and psychotherapists. 1'
By 1973, the draft version of what was to become Uniform
Evidence Rule 503 included a more comprehensive privileged
communications rule for licensed psychiatrists and psychologists.
This draft summarized and restated several existing state stat-
utes. Uniform Rule 503 has since been adopted by twenty-six
states.15 The rule is the paradigm for the contemporary psycho-
therapist-patient privilege, and was the pattern for proposed
Federal Rule 504.
Uniform Rule 503 defines a "patient" as one "who consults or
is examined or interviewed by a [physician or] psychothera-
pist.""' In turn, it defines "psychotherapist" to include the tra-
ditional analytic psychiatrist and all types of licensed psycholo-
gists, but it does not explicitly provide for ancillary mental
health workers such as social workers, counselors and nurses.5
"' See Slovenko, supra note 149, at 185-86 (noting that inviolability of psychia-
trist-patient confidence is essential for achievement of therapeutic goal).
, See Wayne Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group
Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & SOC. ORDER 191, 193.
11 UNIF. R. EVID., 13 U.L.A. §§ 101-1102 (Supp. 1995) (indicating that 39 states
have adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence). Thirteen of the 39 (Arizona, Colorado,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming) have not adopted Rule 503.
See id. at 585-593 & Supp. at 96.
'5' UNIF. R. EVID. 503(a)(1). This broad based definition of "patient" may include
the family members of a primary care patient undergoing family therapy, as well as
the traditional model of one-on-one patient.
UNIF. R. EVID. 503(a)(2)-(3). Reflecting the early phases of the war on drugs,
the rule specifically describes the psychotherapist as a person authorized to practice
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A "confidential communication" is defined to include a communi-
cation between patient and psychotherapist made for purposes of
psychotherapeutic diagnosis and treatment that is not intended
to be disclosed to third persons other than those who are part of
the patient's therapy program.155 Psychotherapeutic diagnosis
and treatment, for purposes of obtaining a privilege under Uni-
form Rule 503, also includes drug and alcohol dependency treat-
ment programs and group therapy sessions, in addition to more
traditional one-on-one therapy.56 The privilege belongs to the
patient, not to the psychotherapist. The psychotherapist is
bound to make a provisional claim of privilege for the patient
when confronted with compulsory disclosure, until the patient's
wishes can be ascertained.'57 The privilege survives the patient's
death and can be claimed by the patient's personal representa-
tive.58
Although the psychotherapist-patient privilege is cast in ab-
solute language, it is qualified by three exceptions. First, com-
munications between a patient and a psychotherapist are not
deemed confidential when the therapist determines that a pa-
tient must be involuntarily committed to a hospital due to men-
tal illness.'59 Second, communications between a patient and a
court appointed psychotherapist in order to determine mental
competency are not privileged due to the need for the psycho-
therapist's testimony.6 ° Third, when the patient bases a claim
psychiatric medicine or psychology "while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a
mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction." Id. at 503(a)(3).
155 UNIF. R. EVID. 503(a)(4). Rule 503(a)(4) describes the kinds of third persons
to whom a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist may be
disclosed without making the communication non-confidential:
A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons, except persons present to further the interest of the patient in the
consultation, examination, or interview, persons reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in
the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the [physician or] psy-
chotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
Id. Thus, a confidential communication does not change if disclosed to third persons
present at the therapy session, or if made to third party co-patients who may com-
municate the patient's confidential matter to the psychotherapist, or to other pa-
tients or family members who are participating in the patient's therapy. Id.
156 UNIF. R. EVID. 503(b) (defining scope of privilege as including persons par-
ticipating in diagnosis or treatment).
" UNIF. R. EVID. 503(c).
158 Id.
"9 UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(1).
"0o UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(2). This exception is limited to the particular purpose
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for relief or defense to liability on a mental, physical or emo-
tional condition, communications between a patient and a psy-
chotherapist, relative to the condition that gives support to the
claim or defense, are not confidential.
16 1
Uniform Rule 503 was comprised of most of the beneficial
provisions of certain state statutes in effect from 1973-75 and
some of the more enlightened federal statutes that granted
qualified privileges to psychotherapy patients.'62 Uniform Rule
503 was included as draft Rule 504 in the 1975 edition of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Congress, however, did not see fit to
adopt the rule. Through the adoption of Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Congress left the role of defining a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege to the courts, which were guided by
"the light of reason and experience.""
Since the federal courts have recognized a common law psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege, the history of the federal common
law psychotherapist-patient privilege closely parallels what Boo-
bar's counsel asked the Maine Supreme Judicial Court to do,
that is, suppress of the alcoholic's statements to fellow AA mem-
bers on the grounds of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Al-
though as early as 1955 at least one federal appellate court had
recognized a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege, the
Supreme Court has reminded us that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence "occupy the field," leaving no room for prior decisional law
for which the examination is ordered. Id.; see Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30,
40 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding that psychiatric examination to determine mental compe-
tency is not within physician-patient privilege).6 UNIF. R. EVID. 503(d)(3). This exception is based upon the principle of
waiver.
162 The Advisory Committee's notes accompanying proposed Federal Rule 504
show that the rule was drawn from work done by California Law Revision Commis-
sion in 1964 that supported §§ 990-1007 of the 1967 California Evidence Code. FED.
R. EVID. 504 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-44 (1973).
The Committee's notes also cite privilege statutes from Illinois, New York, North
Carolina, and 42 U.S.C. § 3419, which provide a limited privilege for confidential
communications between patient and psychotherapist in drug treatment programs
with respect to criminal prosecutions of the patient. Id. Section 4244 of 18 U.S.C.,
which grants a qualified privilege to communications between patient and examin-
ing psychotherapist made during a mental competency examination, precluding its
use in the guilt phase of a subsequent criminal prosecution, was also cited by the
Advisory Commission. Id.
1'3 FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 genuflects to compelling state interests by pro-
viding a clause that requires federal courts to apply state-established privilege rules
in diversity of citizenship cases. See id.
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privileges.!" Consequently, the federal courts have had to work
within the structure of Rule 501 to find a psychotherapist-
patient privilege after the Federal Rules of Evidence became ef-
fective in 1976. However, Rule 501 has offered no helpful guid-
ance to courts in deciding claims of psychotherapist-patient
privilege so courts looked to pre-1975 decisional law for aid in in-
terpretation.165
The first appellate court to analyze a claim of a privileged
communication between psychotherapist and patient rejected it
on the ground that the privilege was unknown to the common
law and not provided for by Congress.'66 This was the prevailing
-view among the federal circuits. 17 However, that view was ini-
tially challenged at the district court level;'68 appellate decisions
from three circuits later followed suit and set forth a contrary
1" Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-89 (1988) (relying solely on
text and legislative history of rules to determine admissibility of evidence).
'6' Rule 501 established a standard to be applied by courts: "the privilege of a
witness, person ... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts in light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID.
501. The Supreme Court analyzed the standard in Rule 501 for the first time and
noted the legislative purpose was not to enact a rigid rule, but rather to "provide the
courts with greater flexibility in developing rules of privilege on a case-by-case ba-
sis." United States v. Grillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1979). The Senate Report accom-
panying the 1975 adoption of the Rules indicates that Rule 501 "should be under-
stood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a
confidential relationship... should be determined on a case-by-case basis." Jaffe v.
Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996) (citations omitted). The Court had previously
noted that Rule 501 directs courts to "continue the evolutionary development of tes-
timonial privileges." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
.. United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976).
..7 See, e.g., United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 176 (1994); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 564 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that
circuit refused to recognize psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal trials).
168 The district court cases began with Judge Weinstein's opinion in Lora v.
Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 574-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), which recognized the strong
policy reasons for granting a psychotherapist-patient privilege and analyzed the
privilege under a constitutionally based privacy interest. The Court balanced the
interests of the privilege against the interests of disclosure. Id. Other district courts
later adopted a similar rationale by holding that a constitutionally-based psycho-
therapist-patient privilege existed in federal litigation. See, e.g., Covell v. CNG
Transmission Corp., 863 F. Supp. 202, 204-06 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (recognizing claim of
privilege, but finding that disclosure interests outweigh interests of privilege);
United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311, 1320, 1322 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (recognizing
privilege in homicide case, but denying privilege on grounds that confidential matter
involved child sexual abuse, which was excluded from privilege), vacated, 116 S. Ct.
1872 (1996); In re Grand Jury No. 91-1, 795 F. Supp. 1057, 1059 (D. Colo. 1992)
(recognizing psychotherapist-patient privilege).
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rule.16
9
The United States Supreme Court has recently affirmed the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Jaffee v. Redmond, providing further support for the
recognition of this privilege7  Jaffee, the administrator of Ricky
Allen's estate, sued Hoffman Estates Village Police Officer Mary
Lu Redmond for damages arising out of Allen's death.' Allen
was shot down by Officer Redmond as he allegedly fled the scene
of an altercation at an apartment house in Hoffman Estates. 2
Following the shooting, Officer Redmond was suspended from
duty and attended counseling sessions with Karen Beyer, a li-
censed clinical social worker employed by the Hoffman Estates
Police Department to counsel officers. 3  When Redmond was
deposed by the plaintiff, she refused to answer questions about
her counseling sessions with Beyer, claiming that the conversa-
tions were privileged.' 4 Plaintiff scheduled a deposition for
Beyer."5 Defendants moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground that the matter sought was privileged, but the court de-
nied the motion.7 6 Beyer refused to answer any questions about
Redmond's counseling sessions at her deposition and she was
cited for contempt.7 7 The district court punished Redmond and
Beyer by refusing to let Redmond testify at trial. 8 The district
court also instructed the jury that it was entitled to presume
that Karen Beyer's undisclosed notes on the interviews with Of-
ficer Redmond were unfavorable to Officer Redmond and to
Hoffinan EstatesY.9  The jury returned a verdict against Red-
'69 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege under Federal Rules of Evidence), af/'d, 116 S. Ct.
1923 (1996); In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing psycho-
therapist-patient privilege under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 501); In re Zuniga,
714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that disclosure of identity of patients and
submission of claims to insurance company is not within scope of psychotherapist
and patient privilege).
70 Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
171 Redmond, 51 F.3d at 1348.
172 Id. at 1349.
'7 Id. at 1350.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1351.
'7 Redmond, 51 F.3d at 1351.
177 Id.
178 Id.
7 Id. at 1351-52. The pertinent part of the court's instruction was as follows:
During Ms. Beyer's testimony she referred to herself as a "therapist," al-
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mond and Hoffman Estates, and defendants appealed. The Sev-
enth Circuit reversed.180
On appeal, Redmond's lawyers argued that the adverse in-
struction called for a reversal. The Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that the existence of a common-law confidential communi-
cations privilege for social workers was a case of first
impression."'1 Turning to the results in other circuits where the
issue of a psychotherapist-patient privilege had been raised, the
court determined that two circuits had found a common law
privilege whereas four had rejected it. The four circuits that had
rejected a claim of privilege, however, had done so under circum-
stances not remotely related to Karen Beyer's situation.82 The
court observed that much had changed within the mental health
field since 1976 when the Fifth Circuit first rejected the com-
mon-law psychotherapist-patient privilege. Recognizing an in-
creased public demand for psychotherapy, particularly when one
has witnessed a violent crime, the court found, as a matter of
legislative judicial notice, that "[t]hese unfortunate individuals,
who include not only law enforcement personnel, but also stu-
dents, school and hospital employees, postal workers, and mem-
bers of the general public, need and deserve the help, support,
and emotional release provided by confidential counseling.""
The court found a socially-driven policy rationale for encour-
though she is not a psychiatrist or psychologist-she is a social worker.
This Court has ruled that there is no legal justification in this lawsuit,
based as it is on a federal constitutional claim, to refuse to produce Ms.
Beyer's notes of her conversations with Mary Lu Redmond, and that such
refusal was unjustified.
Under these circumstances, you are entitled to presume that the contents
of the notes would be unfavorable to Mary Lu Redmond and the Village of
Hoffman Estates.
Id. at 1351-52 n.9 (emphasis omitted).
18' Redmond, 51 F.3d at 1355, 1358 (reasoning that unique relationship between
patients and psychotherapists requires ability to communicate freely without fear of
public disclosure).
... Id. at 1354. Illinois has statutorily provided for a confidential communica-
tions privilege between licensed social worker and client; consequently, the conver-
sation and the resulting therapy notes would have been confidential in a diversity
case. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/lb (West 1993).
182 See Redmond, 51 F.3d at 1355. The court discussed the changing social con-
ditions in the five years subsequent to the previous decisions rejecting the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. Id. The court reasoned that the serious increase in crime
and violence in the United States precipitated the need to provide for confidential
counseling. Id.
183 Id. at 1355.
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aging and supporting psychotherapy administered by social
workers to violent crime witnesses, recognizing a privilege logi-
cally followed. If the purpose of victim-witness therapy was so-
cially laudable, then confidential communications between wit-
ness and therapist should be treated as privileged on the ground
that the witness had a constitutionally protected privacy interest
in such communications. Further, because the psychotherapist-
patient privilege is accepted in all fifty states, the federal courts
should adopt such a privilege out of a spirit of comity."' Finally,
at least three states in addition to Illinois extend the benefit of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege to licensed clinical social
workers.185 These influences persuaded the court to recognize a
common law qualified privilege for confidential communications
between licensed clinical social worker and client. However, the
court stated that the privacy interests of the patient had to out-
weigh the evidentiary need for disclosure of the communications
before the privilege would be recognized and applied to any par-
ticular situation, thus treating the privilege almost on a par with
the work-product rule."8 6 The United States Supreme Court re-
jected this formula and cast the privilege in absolute language.87
The earlier Second and Sixth Circuit decisions recognizing
the confidential communication privilege, applied a similar logic
in determining that this privilege should exist with regard to
conversations between patient and psychotherapist. In re Doe"
dealt with a civil contempt citation issued to a key witness and
'84 See Redmond, 51 F.3d at 1356. The court stated that:
We are cognizant of the fact that all fifty states have recognized the need
for and have adopted varying forms of the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege... Although federal common law governs our recognition of privilege
in this case,.., the law of privilege as developed by the states is not irrele-
vant as the Supreme Court "has taken note of state privilege laws in de-
termining whether to retain them in the federal system"
Id. (emphasis added); see also Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664
F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) ("'[A] strong policy of comity between state and fed-
eral sovereignties impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can
be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural pol-
icy.'"). The widespread recognition of the psychotherapist/patient privilege in all
fifty states is strong evidence that "experience with [the privilege] has been favor-
able." In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992).
'5 See Redmond, 51 F.3d at 1356 n.17. These states, according to the court,
were California, Florida, and Virginia. Id.
' Id. at 1357.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (1996).
,s' In re Doe, 964 F.2d at 1326.
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his psychotherapist. Steven Diamond was indicted for extortion,
largely on the strength of the witness' grand jury testimony.189
The government notified Diamond's counsel that John Doe, the
key witness, suffered from depression and had consulted a psy-
chiatrist.90 The trial judge requested in camera review of the
witness' psychotherapeutic records, and subsequently ordered
the records turned over to the defendant, despite Doe's insistent
claim of privilege. 9' The records disclosed that Doe had a long
history of mental illness and had been diagnosed as "paranoid"
and suffering from "narcissistic trends."'92 Doe refused to answer
questions about his mental health during a pre-trial hearing and
was held in contempt.'93 He appealed the contempt citation, and
the Second Circuit affirmed.' The court held that Rule 501 con-
trolled, necessitating the determination of whether a privilege
should be extended to confidential communications between psy-
chotherapist and patient in federal courts as a matter of common
law.'95 The court recognized that forty-nine states, including
New York, had adopted a similar privilege. 99 After recognizing
the existence of the privilege, it held that the defendant was still
entitled to discover the key witness's psychological history prior
to trial at an in camera hearing, reserving the right to grant a
protective order forbidding disclosure. The court felt that this
sufficiently protected the witness' privacy rights.'97 The Doe de-
cision appeared to be rooted less in constitutional concerns over
the right to privacy than in a concern for unequal recognition of
the privilege in New York state and federal courts.'98
Zuniga also involved compulsory disclosure of patient infor-
mation. Two psychiatrists were subpoenaed to testify before a
189 Id.
190 Id.
'9' Id. at 1326-27.
"" Id. at 1327.
'9 In re Doe, 964 F.2d at 1327.
4 Id. at 1329.
19 Id. at 1328-29.
See, e.g., Exparte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 505 (Ala. 1993)
(according same level of protection as attorney-client privilege to psychotherapist-
patient privilege); District Attorney for Norfolk Dist. v. Magraw, 628 N.E.2d 24, 26
(Mass. 1994) (describing policy reasons supporting psychotherapist-patient privilege
which includes fostering open communication resulting in more effective assis-
tance).
'9' In re Doe, 964 F.2d at 1329.
198 Id. at 1328.
"0 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Michigan grand jury investigating health insurance fraud. They
were served with subpoenae duces tecum calling for "[platient
files, progress notes, ledger cards, copies of insurance claim form
and any other documents supporting dates of service rendered"
to a list of people insured through Blue Cross/Blue Shield.2"'
Both psychiatrists refused to comply with the subpoenae on the
grounds that providing the patient records would violate the pa-
tients' psychotherapist-patient privilege. The district court re-
jected the argument and cited both psychiatrists for contempt.
Their appeals were consolidated and heard by the Sixth Circuit,
which affirmed.20'
The Sixth Circuit, however, chose to adopt the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege. The court explained its rationale by not-
ing that Rule 501 instructs the courts that privileges "shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as ... interpreted
by the courts ... in light of reason and experience."2 2 Examining
the rejected Rule 504 that provided for a psychotherapist-patient
privilege,"3 the Sixth Circuit held that it had the authority to
recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court referred
to Report No. 45 for the Advancement of Psychiatry2°4 and Taylor
v. United States.5 as policy sources for the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. The policy supporting the privilege proved
compelling to the Sixth Circuit, which held that the psycho-
therapist-patient relationship is socially valuable and cannot be
successfully maintained unless the patient is assured that her
innermost feelings and thoughts are free from compulsory expo-
sure. The interests that the privilege furthers include effective
treatment for the mentally ill, and the ability to seek psycho-
therapy."7 The court explained that mental illness prevented
people from understanding religious and political ideas and hin-
dered the ability to communicate ideas to others. The court ac-
2" Id. at 634.
201 Id. at 642.
m Id. at 636.
203 Id. at 636-37 (explaining why Congress' refusal to adopt proposed Rule 504
does not preclude recognition of psychiatrist-patient privilege).
214 Report No. 45, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 92 (1960), quoted in
Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. at 242.
2" 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (holding that policy underpinning psychiatrist-
patient privilege is "clear and strong").
200 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 638 (6th Cir. 1983).
., The ability to seek psychotherapy is likely supported by "many fundamental
freedoms, particularly those protected by the First Amendment." See id. at 639.
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cepted Professor Stephen Smith's thesis that a threshold level of
mental health is required for any citizen to form a belief and
value system and to engage in political discourse."8
For reasons best understood by the panel, the court did not
support its conclusion with a constitutional law analysis, which
would likely identify the right to personal privacy as the source
of the privilege. This appears to conflict with the essence of Pro-
fessor Smith's article which devoted a great deal of space to ex-
amining the privilege as it related to the constitutionally recog-
nized right to privacy.0 9 In affirming the psychiatrists' contempt
citations, the court weighed the privacy interests of the patients
involved against the need for compulsory disclosure. The court
reasoned that minimal harm would be done to the patients if
their records were disclosed to verify billings to insurance com-
panies. The court accepted the assertion that the grand jury's
cloak of secrecy would adequately protect the patients' privacy
rights.2
10
The history of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in fed-
eral practice supporting a privilege for confidential communica-
tions between patient and mental health worker rests on prag-
matic social policy grounds. If society values psychotherapy and
wants to encourage citizens to utilize psychotherapists in order
to improve mental health, then society should provide a privilege
preventing compulsory disclosure. Since the privilege is rooted
in pragmatic evaluation of the competing interests of a patient's
well-being and society's need for information, the privilege is
qualified rather than absolute. Some confidential communica-
tions between patient and psychotherapist will be protected
when the societal need for disclosure is less than the patient's
need for protection of confidential information.
201 Id.; see also Smith, supra note 124.
209 See Smith, supra note 124, at 15-32. Professor Smith espouses a persuasive
argument for a constitutionally-rooted psychotherapist-patient privilege derived
from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), among other privacy cases. Id. Pro-
fessor Smith notes that therapy is impossible if the patient does not trust the
therapist. Professor Smith also argues that a constitutionally protected right to in-
formational privacy, similar to the rights protected by tort law, is found in existing
case law, including Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), which acknowl-
edged a taxpayer's privacy interest in information used to prepare tax returns. Id.
at 28-29.
210 See In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 642.
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B. Clergy-Communicant Privilege
Confidential communications between members of a congre-
gation and a clergy person are analogous to confidential com-
munications between members of Twelve Step Groups. All
Twelve Step programs acknowledge the existence of a power
greater than the individual who provides spiritual guidance to
program members and encourage prayer and meditation as a
means of establishing contact with the higher power.21' Although
all Twelve Step programs are careful to assure members that
they are not "religious" programs, each recognizes the impor-
tance of spirituality as a way of coping with an addiction, and
each insists that a great portion of one's personal recovery be de-
voted to spiritual growth through prayer and meditation. Like
the Society of Friends, the Twelve Step Groups have no ordained
clergy. Spiritual guidance may be provided by any member who
is moved to share her experience, strength and hope during a
meeting. Each Twelve Step Group also insists that part of the
recovery program includes a confidential admission of one's
"defects of character" to God, to oneself, and to another mem-
ber." Consequently, a brief examination of the clergy-
communicant privilege may be helpful.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize a
privilege for confidential communications between a member of a
congregation and a clergy member.213 Although many scholars
21 The Eleventh Step of AA states that members should improve their
"conscious contact with God" through prayer and meditation to recover from alcohol-
ism, "praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out."
See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 46, at 59.
22 Id.; see supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 45-54
and accompanying text (development of moral re-armament movement infusing
spiritual context into alcoholic recovery program); notes 54-61 and accompanying
text (adoption of spiritual conversion and confession by Oxford Groups).
223 Alabama: ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1996); Alaska: ALASKA R. EVID. 505; Ari-
zona: APIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2233 (1996); Arkansas: ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-41-101
(Michie 1995); California: CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West 1996); Colorado: COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(1)(c) (1996); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b
(1995); Delaware: DEL. R. EVID. 505 (West 1996); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-309 (1981); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1995); Georgia: GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-9-22(1996); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT., § 626-1 (1996); Idaho: IDAHO
CODE § 9-203 (1996); Illinois: 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-803 (West 1995); Indi-
ana: IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West 1996); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West
1995); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1995); Kentucky: KY. R. EViD. 505
(Michie 1995); Louisiana: LA. CODE EVID. ANN. Art. 511 (West 1995); Maine: ME. R.
EVID. 505 (1996); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (1996);
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (1996); Michigan: MICH.
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insisted that the common law after the Reformation did not rec-
ognize the seal of the confessional and rejected pleas that com-
munications between priest and penitent were privileged,21 the
privilege was recognized in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia without benefit of statute in 1958,215 and followed in
other circuits from 1958 to 1977.216 The priest-penitent privilege
was ultimately recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in 1980 in Trammel v. United States. 7 Since Trammel, federal
courts continued to recognize a judge-made clergy-communicant
privilege. 218
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a(2) (West 1996); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(c)
(West 1996); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (1995); Missouri: Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.060(4) (West 1995); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1995); Ne-
braska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1995); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1995);
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (1995); New Jersey: N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2a:84A-23 (West 1996); New Mexico: N.M. R. EVID. 11-506 (1996); New York:
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKimnney 1996); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2
(1995); North Dakota: N.D. R. EVID. 505 (1992); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.02 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West
1995); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1995); Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5943 (West 1996); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1995); South
Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op 1995); South Dakota: S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 19-13-16 (Michie 1996); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206
(1996); Texas: TEX. R. EVID. 505 (1996); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1996);
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1995); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.3
(Michie 1996); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 1995); West
Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (1996); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West
1995); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 1996).
214 See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 102, § 76.2, at 184; WIGMORE ON EVI-
DENCE, supra note 103, § 2394; HON. JACK WEINSTEIN & MARILYN BERGER,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 505.01[01] (1995); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
113, § 5611, at 14-15.
215 See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J. con-
curring) (finding confession is privileged and not competent evidence).
216 United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1973) (priest-penitent
privilege could not be used to protect disclosure of church financial records); United
States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971) (privilege recognized but letter from de-
fendant to priest held outside privilege); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435-36
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (draft counseling within scope of priest-penitent privilege); Cimi-
jotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621, 624-25 (N.D. Iowa 1963) (applying state priest-
penitent privilege in diversity case).
217 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (dicta) (defining marital privilege as broader in scope than
priest-penitent privilege). "The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need
to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are be-
lieved to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance
in return." Id. at 51.
211 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1990)
(defining scope of privilege); United States v. Dub6, 820 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that conversation regarding tax evasion was not confidential); United
States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that business communi-
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The outline of the judge made clergy-communicant privilege
is clear from federal case law. The substance and limitations of
the clergy privilege were clearly delineated in In re Grand Jury
Investigation.19 Lutheran Pastor Ernest Knoche was involved in
family counseling with four people implicated in a fire-bombing
incident in his community.20  The federal grand jury issued a
subpoena to Pastor Knoche requiring him to appear and testify
about matters discussed in the group counseling session. The
pastor moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that the
communications were made to him in his pastoral capacity and
were privileged. The district court granted the motion to quash,
holding that Pastor Knoche had standing to claim the privilege
on behalf of his communicants.2 On appeal the Third Circuit
reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether
the four suspects had consulted Pastor Knoche in his spiritual
capacity, and had done so with a reasonable expectation of confi-dentiality.22
Noting that Rule 501 was a mandate to the courts to develop
judge-made privilege law on a case-by-case basis, the panel
turned to Uniform Rule 506 which had been proposed to Con-
gress as a starting point.2 3 Uniform Rule 506 provided a privi-
lege for confidential communications 2 14 made to the clergyman 5
cations with priest not privileged); Griffin v. Coughlin, 743 F. Supp. 1006, 1027
(N.D.N.Y. 1990) (indicating privacy as basis of privilege); Miranda v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (dicta) (recognizing priest-penitent
privilege); Eckmann v. Board of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (indicating
that spiritual advisor is sufficient conduct to invoke privilege); Deuterium Corp. v.
United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 361, 364 (1984) (dicta) (privilege recognized); Long v.
Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 1642 (1985) (recognized but not applicable to tax rec-
ords of church).
2" 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990).
210 Two suspects, a husband and wife, were members of his congregation. Id. at
378.
21 See id. The court further held that the presence of the adult son's fianc6 did
not destroy the confidential nature of the counseling session. Id. at n.4.
Id. at 387.
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 378-81. The court was careful
to point out that Congress did not disapprove of proposed Rule 506 but, in light of
Erie and Rule 501, wanted the scope of the privilege to be decided on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 380.
22 "A communication is 'confidential' if made privately and not intended for fur-
ther disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the
communication." Id. at 380.
'"Clergyman" is defined in Rule 506 as a "minister, priest, rabbi, or other
similar functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed
so to be by the person consulting him." Id.
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in his professional capacity as a spiritual advisor. The privilege
belonged to the person who made the confidential communica-
tion, but the clergyman had the right and obligation to assert the
privilege conditionally on behalf of the communicant. 6 After
noting that federal courts had recognized the privilege before
and after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
court asked whether the clergy-communicant privilege met Dean
Wigmore's four conditions for a confidential communications
privilege.227 Upon finding that the clergy-communicant privilege
met Wigmore's test, the court announced that the privilege was
recognized in the Third Circuit.228  The court also established
that the presence of third persons other than the communicants
and the clergy member, would not destroy the privileged nature
of the transaction so long as the communicants and the clergy
member had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.229
United States courts, therefore, currently recognize two
privileges, the hybrid of which should be applicable to confiden-
tial communications between members of Twelve Step Groups.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege extends to confidential
communications between psychotherapist and patient made for
the purpose of furthering the socially laudable goal of obtaining
mental health. The privilege extends to drug and alcohol coun-
seling, including group therapy, provided by psychotherapists to
addicts. Although the privilege is qualified and may not rest on
constitutional grounds, the patient's interest in confidentiality,
which aids therapy, generally outweighs the public need for in-
formation in grand jury proceedings and at trial. The clergy-
communicant privilege includes confidential communications be-
tween communicant and clergy member. It furthers the consti-
tutionally-protected right of free exercise of religion, since pas-
toral counseling is a part of religious practice. 3 ' The privilege is
22 See id. The court observed that the clergy-communicant privilege was one of
the least controversial privileges in the selection proposed by the authors of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. It further observed that nearly every U.S. jurisdiction
had recognized the clergy-communicant privilege by rule or statute. Id. at 381.
22 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 103, § 2285; see supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text (Dean Wigmore's criteria).
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 383-84.
22 See id. at 385-86. The privilege was said to be "indelibly ensconced" in Ameri-
can common law. Id. at 381. As for the policy basis, the court cited Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), with favor and noted the substantial public bene-
fit of spiritual guidance fostered by trust and confidence. 918 F.2d. at 384.
2" See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 383. The court noted that the
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not qualified; therefore, matters communicated to a clergy mem-
ber under the privilege may not be subject to the balancing of
public need for information against private need for confidential-
ity. Finally, the clergy-communicant privilege has been held to
apply to group discussions and is not limited to statements made
to a priest. 1
Both privileges provide support for recognizing a confiden-
tial communications privilege within Twelve Step Groups. These
groups combine elements of group psychotherapy with spiritual
counseling as an integral part of their operating procedures.
C. Utilitarian Justification For Privilege For Twelve Step
Groups
Assuming that Dean Wigmore's four part test for a confi-
dential communications privilege represents the most commonly
accepted, pragmatic and Utilitarian method for recognizing a
new privilege, the successful application of the test to the opera-
tions of Twelve Step Groups should provide strong support for
judicial recognition and adoption of a group therapy privilege.
1. The Communications Must Originate in a Confidence That
They Will Not Be Disclosed
On the table at every AA, Narcotics Anonymous, Al-Anon,
and other Twelve Step Groups, there is a blue card with white
printing that reads: "What you see here, what you hear here,
when you leave here, let it stay here." The suggested closing to
every AA or A-Anon meeting contains the following statement:
"The things you heard were spoken in confidence and should be
treated as confidential. Keep them within the walls of this room
and the confines of your mind."
People attend Twelve Step Group meetings and communi-
cate with sponsors believing that their confidential secrets, in-
cluding their defects of character, will not be disclosed to anyone
outside the meeting or sponsor relationship without their con-
sent. Confidentiality also protects members' anonymity, which
is one of the cardinal principles of any Twelve Step program.
Anonymity cannot be preserved unless meetings and sponsorship
contacts are deemed confidential.
proposed Rule 506 "would have extended the clergy-communicant privilege to group
discussions." Id. at 380.
2' See supra notes 215 & 217.
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2. This Element of Confidentiality Must Be Essential to the Full
and Satisfactory Maintenance of the Relation Between the
Parties
Anonymity is also an integral means of protecting the repu-
tation, job security and lives of group members. The Eleventh
and Twelfth Traditions of AA and other Twelve Step groups un-
derscores the importance of personal anonymity.232 To Al-Anon
members, who may be living with a violent alcoholic who will re-
taliate physically if the alcoholic finds out the other person is at-
tending Al-Anon, anonymity could be a matter of life and
death." ' For Twelve Step Group members, however, there is an-
other overriding reason for maintaining personal anonymity at
all costs. Anonymity is deemed to be the spiritual foundation of
every Twelve Step Group program. As the official commentary
on Al-Anon's Twelfth Tradition puts it:
22 The eleventh tradition states that "Our public relations policy is based on at-
traction rather than promotion; we need always maintain personal anonymity at the
level of press, radio, TV and films." MILTON A. MAXWELL, PH.D., THE ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS EXPERIENCE: A CLOSE UP VIEW FOR PROFESSIONALS 141 (1984). Al-
Anon adds the following:"We must guard with special care the anonymity of all AA
members." The Twelfth Tradition says that "Anonymity is the spiritual foundation
of all our Traditions, ever reminding us to place principles above personalities." Id.;
AL-ANON FAMILY GROUP HEADQUARTERS, INC., ONE DAY AT A TIME IN AL-ANON 18,
66, 230 (1970) [hereinafter ONE DAY AT A TIME]. ONE DAY AT A TIME is a daily guide
for Al-Anon members containing three hundred and sixty-five pages of inspirational
messages tied to specific AA traditions. Three sections deal specifically with ano-
nymity:
I belong to Al-Anon in order to learn how to live at peace with myself and
others. To this end I have a responsibility to my group members never to
reveal anyone's secrets. I must protect the anonymity of my fellow mem-
bers and their families. Only in this way can I help my group grow in is ca-
pability to help others. Above all, I will never identify a story by a personal
name. Just as I want to be assured that others will not repeat what I say at
meetings or what I tell another member in confidence, so I will guard
against indiscretion.
Id. at 18.
See ONE DAYATATIME, supra note 232, at 230.
[We are reassured to discover that Al-Anon has a protective cloak of ano-
nymity for us. Every member understands that no word of the proceedings
must ever go beyond the meeting room, and especially that no names
should ever be mentioned ... The newcomer to Al-Anon immediately feel
comforted and safe when'she learns that she can talk freely without fear of
having anything repeated. We owe her this assurance. We are committed
to it by our own Traditions, as well as by our personal need for protection
against careless gossip ... I will remind myself daily that I must guard
against revealing anything concerning Al-Anon or an Al-Anon member.
Id. (Twelfth Tradition).
[Vol. 70:693
THE FUTILE FIFTH STEP
Anonymity is the spiritual foundation of all our traditions, ever
reminding us to place principles above personalities. This
Twelfth Tradition by which we try to live should be kept in
mind by all of us, at all times. It is the secret of success in the
Al-Anon way of life .... What we hear in an Al-Anon meeting,
and privately from our Al-Anon friends, is meant to help us. It
must be kept locked in our hearts, just as we want to be sure
others are keeping locked up what we tell them ... outside our
fellowship, I will allow myself to speak only of Al-Anon princi-
ples, never of personalities. My success with the program de-
234pends on each person's discretion.
If anyone who attends an AA or Al-Anon meeting can be re-
quired to disclose the fact that another person was present at the
meeting, anonymity is breached and the program's effectiveness
is seriously impaired.
3. The Relation Must Be One Which in the Opinion of the
Community Ought to be Sedulously Fostered
Alcoholics Anonymous and allied Twelve Step programs en-
joy widespread support among alcohol and drug treatment coun-
selors, psychotherapists, law enforcement agencies and the gen-
eral public.235 Public concern over drug and alcohol abuse, and
24 Id. at 66, 230 (quoting Twelfth Tradition).
131 Widespread support for Alcoholics Anonymous and its companion groups is
readily documented from a variety of literary sources. See, e.g., DENNIS C. DALEY,
SURVIVING ADDICTION: A GUIDE FOR ALCOHOLICS, DRUG ADDICTS AND THEIR
FAMILIES (1988); MAXVELL, supra note 232; C.L. WHITFIELD, ALCOHOLISM AND
SPIRITUALITY (Baltimore: The Resources Group, Inc., 1985); Edward M. Read,
Twelve Steps to Sobriety: Probation Officers 'Working the Program": FED. PRO-
BATION, Dec. 1990, at 34; John J. Rumbarger, The "Story" of Bill W: Ideology, Cul-
ture, and the Discovery of the Modern American Alcoholic, 20 CONTEMP. DRUG
PROBS. 759 (1993). The fall 1990 issue of LIFE featured Bill W., the founder of Alco-
holics Anonymous as one of its choices for the most influential men of the Twentieth
Century. Alcoholics Anonymous, however, is not without its detractors. See
CHARLES BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS: CULT OR CURE? (1991) (asserting that AA
has serious cult-like tendencies); see also HERBERT FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING,
THE MYTH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE (1988) (attacking spiritual foundation of
AA-that alcoholics are powerless over alcohol and cannot stop drinking without
intervention from higher power). Alcoholics Anonymous believes that the compul-
sion to drink is incurable and only total alcohol abstinence can free the alcoholic
from the compulsion to drink. "For [members] Alcoholics Anonymous often becomes
an alternative way of life .... This passionate and complete reorientation is not a
unique phenomenon; it is rather like what critics of sects would call ideological re-
education or a modest form of elective brainwashing." Id. at 3 & 18. According to
Fingarette, alcoholics can be cured by a treatment regimen that conditions them to
be normal social drinkers. See id. at 114-29. Fingarette's clinical findings are based
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by-products of these conditions such as drug related crime, do-
mestic violence and child abuse is at an all time high. Alcohol
and drug addiction in particular, cost society billions of dollars
each year. First, there are the direct costs of arrest, prosecution,
defense and incarceration of drug and alcohol offenders, the two
largest groups of offenders in the criminal justice system.1 6 Sec-
ond, there are the direct costs of drug and alcohol dependency
treatment facilities, born in part by public agencies and increas-
ingly by group medical insurance programs. Third, there are the
indirect costs to society, such as increased dependency on public
assistance for the families of addicts, lost work time, industrial
accidents, and traffic accidents resulting from addictions. The
Twelve Step programs do lead some members to remission of
symptoms of addiction to alcohol, narcotics, food, sex and other
types of obsessive behavior. Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics
Anonymous, and allied Twelve Step Groups are self-supporting,
low-cost alternatives to this massive, costly infrastructure that
provides support for those who are addicted and their families.
4. The Injury That Would Inure to the Relation by the
Disclosure of the Communications Must Be Greater than the
Benefit Thereby Gained for the Correct Disposal of Litigation
Wigmore's final principle requires the courts to work a calcu-
lus equation to decide whether to grant privileged status to a
particular communication. Intuitively, it seems disclosure of
some confidential communications would do little harm to the
person making the communication and would greatly assist the
courts in reaching a correct resolution in a particular situation.
This seems to be the case when grand juries investigate Medi-
care, Medicaid, and health insurance fraud involving psycho-
on a behavioralist understanding of human activity. Id. at 118. An appropriate
combination of positive operant conditioning and negative conditioning can modify
an alcoholic's drinking behavior from abuse to socially acceptable drinking levels.
See id. at 118-29. Fingarette's claims have been disputed by other researchers be-
cause he has no long-term follow-up data on his patients. See, e.g., William Madsen,
The Alcoholism Controversy: Thin Thinking About Heavy Drinking, 95 PUB.
INTEREST 112, 118 (Spring 1989); Gene Kasma, Addictions as Diseases, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Aug. 1, 1990, at 10A (characterizing Fingarette's work as
"sensationalism and short on substance").
2- See generally ROBERT NASH PARKER & LINDA ANNE REBHOAN, ALCOHOL &
HOMICIDE: A DEADLY COMBINATION OF TWO AMERICAN TRADITIONS (1995)
(comprehensive study of correlation between alcohol and crime and effect of treat-
ment programs supported by justice system).
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therapists. When a psychotherapist who has previously billed
services to a health insurance company stating the patient's
name and diagnosis is ordered to turn over that information to a
grand jury, which itself is a secret ex-parte proceeding, the pa-
tient suffers little, if any, harm from this disclosure."7 In this
instance, the grand jury's need for information in order to indict
offenders is substantial and courts usually suspect that the psy-
chotherapist has spuriously raised the claim of privilege in order
to avoid indictment.
On the other hand, in cases where the disclosure of the
identity of the communicator would lead to arrest or to joining
the communicator as a party defendant to civil litigation, and the
recipient is a psychotherapist or a clergy member, the value of
non-disclosure rises because the risk of substantial harm to the
communicator is greater. In such cases, where the need to know
remains relatively constant, the courts uphold claims of privi-
lege. 8
Courts can apply these principles to a Twelve Step Group
member's claim of privilege with relative ease. An illustration
from People v. Cox may help: Paul Cox apparently was identified
as the perpetrator of the homicide with which he was charged
because of a statement he made during an AA meeting or to an
AA sponsor about the crime. At trial, the same individual, testi-
fying without losing his personal anonymity, identified Cox as
the person who had vague recollections about committing a hor-
rible crime." Had the court recognized a Twelve Step Group
member's claim of privilege, it would have balanced society's
need to identify the perpetrator of a homicide against an AA
member's need for anonymity. Since the loss of anonymity de-
stroys the program for that AA member, the harm done to the
AA member is immeasurable, not to mention the harm done to
27 See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that disclo-
sure of patient's name does not fall within privilege); Doe v. United States, 711 F.2d
1187, 1193 (2d Cir. 1983) (refusing to recognize privilege).
See, e.g., Simpson v. Tennant, 871 S.W.2d 301, 308-09 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that identity of communicator is privileged where clergy member received
confidential communication about identity of probable wrong-doer in bus accident).
The court found the benefit of preserving the privilege greatly overshadowed "the
possible benefit of permitting litigation to prosper at the expense of the ... spiritual
rehabilitation of a penitent." Id. at 309 (citation omitted).
2 See Berger, supra note 2, at B1; Killings of Larchmont Doctors Described at
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1994, at B1.
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the AA meeting where the disclosure occurred.240 Further, once
AA members or AA candidates learn of the compulsory disclo-
sure the program will collapse. Society has other means to
identify the perpetrator of the crime which apparently were not
well used in the Cox case. 41
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that there is a sound,
pragmatic basis for a privileged communication claim to be as-
serted for confidential communications made by AA members in
meetings, or in conversations with a sponsor. Here the commu-
nication is intended to be confidential, and involves important
social interests such as fostering and encouraging Twelve Step
Groups in their mission to provide self-help treatment for addicts
and their obsessive behavior.
D. Justification Founded on Constitutional Right to Privacy
The previous discussion leading to a pragmatic justification
for a Twelve Step privilege sets forth a legal justification for a
qualified privilege. In each instance, the court had to weigh the
relative merits of disclosure against the relative merits of non-
disclosure from the subjective and fact bound viewpoint that
leads to inconsistent and varying results.242 Unless inconsistent
decisions regarding privileged communication status is a value
that society wishes to protect, a better foundation for a claim of
privilege should be sought.
There is a stronger justification for an unqualified Twelve
Step privilege than expediency and the working of calculus
equations in fact-bound cases. Disclosure of confidential com-
munications between Twelve Step Group members is an invasion
of the privacy of the communicator and the listener. Both the
communicator and the listener have a reasonable expectation
240 See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
241 To be sure, no AA member would countenance Paul Cox making a disclosure
that he had committed a serious crime either in sharing at a meeting or in a talk
with a sponsor. Indeed, Cox would quickly find out that the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
and Ninth Steps of AA required him to contact the police and voluntarily turn him-
self in. See supra note 93.
242 It is precisely the inherent fallibility of the pragmatic justification for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal practice that has led to a split among
the circuits on the mere existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, and its
application to concrete fact situations. For that reason, the matter has now been
thrown into the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the competing demands for privi-
leged protection for effective psychotherapy and the public's need to have access to
information for resolution of serious disputes.
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that their participation in the communication will be kept confi-
dential. Otherwise, both will lose their anonymity. The right to
privacy is constitutionally-protected. In at least one instance, a
state court has recognized that, with certain exceptions, the psy-
chotherapist-patient relationship is protected by state estab-
lished constitutional rights to privacy."' This generalization in-
spired a well reasoned article by Professor Steven R. Smith
entitled, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, demonstrating
that the psychotherapist-patient relationship is protected by the
United States Constitution.2 " Professor Smith also relies on
Judge Hufstetter's ground-breaking opinion in Caesar v.
Mountanos"4 supporting a federally-recognized psychotherapist-
patient privilege rooted in the line of United States Supreme
Court cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut.2"
The particular understanding of the constitutionally-
protected right to privacy followed by Professor Smith can be
traced to Roe v. Wade, which ties the right to privacy to funda-
mental rights protected by the liberty interests of the Fourteenth
Amendment 47 including privacy in marriage, procreation and
child rearing. 48 Professor Smith places the right to effective psy-
chotherapy among these fundamental rights.
Smith presents a compelling analysis of constitutionally-
based privacy rights supporting the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. First, Smith identifies the right to be free of govern-
mental intrusions in areas of fundamental concern, or the right
of autonomy, as a constitutionally-protected privacy right.2" A
243 See In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970) (finding privilege is grounded in
patient's constitutional right to privacy and case falls within patient-litigant excep-
tion).
244 See Smith, supra note 124.245 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976); see Smith, supra note 124, at 7-10.
216 See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1976). The court
tracks the development of the relevant privacy jurisprudence from Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that married couples have constitutional right
to privacy guaranteeing right to use contraceptives), to Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (stating constitutional right to privacy in physician-patient
relationship).
247 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (stating constitutional right to pri-
vacy may be found in concept of liberty guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment);
Smith, supra note 124, at 18-21.
218 Smith relied on Justice Brennan's explanation of the basis for a woman's
right to choose to carry or to abort a fetus. See Smith, supra note 124, at 18-21; see
also Roe, 410 U. S. at 152-53.
249 See Smith, supra note 124, at 21.
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person may invoke the autonomy aspect of the right to privacy
when the government intrudes upon a vital matter of personal
concern without a compelling governmental interest, or when the
governmental action is not narrowly tailored to advance the
state interest.25 ° The right to be free of governmental interfer-
ence in regard to mental health, Smith argues, is such a funda-
mental right. The state, therefore, cannot place a direct burden
on the right to pursue mental health through psychotherapy
which would disrupt the therapeutic relationship. Consequently,
subpoenae directed to psychotherapists compelling them to give
evidence before a grand jury in a deposition or in open court on
the symptoms related to them by patients would be direct bur-
dens on the right to mental health therapy and may be found un-
constitutional. Compulsory disclosure or production of patient
billing records to insurance companies already authorized for
release by the patient to the insurer, however, are indirect bur-
dens on this right and probably constitutional.25'
Professor Smith also recognizes the right to prevent disclo-
sure of personal matters as another fundamental aspect of the
constitutional right to privacy. This interest in freedom from
compulsory disclosure of information is less well articulated in
case law than the right of personal autonomy.252 Relying on
Whalen v. Roe25 and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,2" Profes-
sor Smith identifies four characteristics that must be met before
any information is constitutionally-protected by the right to pri-
vacy: first, the information must be highly sensitive and meant
to be confidential; second, the information has to be private;
third, it must be shown that dissemination of the information
outside a limited number of governmental officials is impossible
to control, or the information is so sensitive that collection of the
information by the state offends right to privacy; and fourth,
there must be no compelling state interest in obtaining the in-
formation, or less invasive method of advancing the state's le-
2" Id. at 21.
25' See id. at 22, 24-27.
212 See id. at 27.
21 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that New York statute requiring physicians to
file patient's prescription with state was not unconstitutional); see Smith, supra
note 124, at 28, 41-43.
428 U.S. 52 (1976) (challenging constitutionality of Missouri abortion statute
containing reporting and record keeping requirements); see Smith, supra note 124,
at 38, 41-43.
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gitimate interest.255 Professor Smith asserts that no matter is
more personal than information revealed during psychotherapy.
Exchanges between patient and psychotherapist are not gener-
ally available to the public. The government cannot provide pro-
tection against dissemination of such information if the infor-
mation is disclosed at trial or during a civil deposition. If no
compelling state interest requires disclosure, then disclosure is
privileged. Professor Smith further asserts that only three gen-
erally recognized compelling state interests justify invasion of
privacy: (1) preventing violent overthrow of the government; (2)
preserving democracy; and (3) resolving or accommodating con-
flicts between fundamental rights.25 Professor Smith also notes
that some rights are so fundamental that they are described as
"essential" and not subject to invasion by any compelling state
interest. Typically, these rights flow from the First and Fifth
Amendments.257
This non-disclosure aspect of the right to privacy is acknowl-
edged by Professor Smith as creating only a qualified privilege.
He acknowledges the common exceptions for a patient who
makes his own mental condition an issue in litigation, an excep-
tion for reporting an imminent threat of harm to a third person
at the hand of a patient or imminent criminal behavior, a Sixth
Amendment exception for psychiatric information on state's wit-
nesses in criminal prosecutions, reporting child abuse, court or-
dered psychiatric evaluations, and civil commitment cases. 8
Professor Smith's taxonomic description of a constitution-
ally-rooted psychotherapist-patient privilege is strikingly similar
to proposed Federal Rule 506. What Smith's article contributes
is a firm basis for this privilege in the Fourteenth Amendment
due process and equal protection clauses. The right to personal
autonomy and freedom from disclosing confidential information
is protected against state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Communications between patient and psychotherapist for
the purpose of seeking mental health treatment can be catego-
rized as protected under either the personal autonomy freedom
from compulsory disclosure of confidential information aspects of
the constitutional right of privacy.
= See Smith, supra note 124, at 28.
2s See id. at 32-33.
27 See id. at 34-35.
2 Id. at 48-59.
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The same argument supports a confidential communications
privilege for Twelve Step Group members. Communications at
AA and Al-Anon meetings are often as deeply personal and con-
fidential as communications between psychotherapist and pa-
tient in the traditional one-on-one office setting. Personal
autonomy protects the identity of the anonymous persons at
meetings from compulsory disclosure. Rarely will the state have
a compelling interest in forcing compulsory disclosure because
confidential communications at Twelve Step meetings almost
never involve plots to overthrow the government or conflicts be-
tween fundamental rights. Avoiding death and serious injury to
the public, however, may be a compelling state interest that
would invite invasion of the privacy of a Twelve Step Group
member. Indeed, the need for all information necessary to the
proper resolution of a civil action or criminal prosecution might
well be considered a compelling state interest. If so, the ration-
ale for a Twelve Step Group privilege based on constitutional
right to privacy is neither stronger than nor significantly differ-
ent from the rationale described by Dean Wigmore based on
pragmatic concerns.
However, the Twelve Step Group program is more than self-
help psychotherapy or a brand of "tough-love." It is a spiritual
discipline that abstracts universal principles relating to the re-
lationship between a higher power and human beings from all
the world's religious views.59 Its members accept the spiritual
discipline which is spelled out in the Twelve Steps. Since free-
dom of conscience is an essential right guaranteed by the First
Amendment, compulsory disclosure of communications between
Twelve Step Group members necessarily involves concerns vir-
tually identical to those involving compulsory disclosure of the
internal spiritual affairs of an organized religious denomination.
The First Amendment guarantees of free exercise of one's beliefs
and freedom of association inhibit governmental interference in
29 See ERNST KURTZ, NOT-GOD: A HISTORY OF ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 175-98
(1979). The author notes that AA is "spiritual rather than religious." Members of AA
"tend to enforce this distinction vigorously." This is said to "bear...
vivid witness to A.A.'s authentic modernity, especially as a religious phenomenon,"
as AA has managed to collapse the essence of all religions into one "spiritual" mes-
sage. Id. at 175; see also MARY C. DARRAH, SISTER IGNATIA: ANGEL OF ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS (1992). It is stated that "A.A.'s entire philosophy and program was
spiritual ... To miss the spiritual angle was to have missed the thrust of the entire
program." Id. at 97.
[Vol. 70:693
THE FUTILE FIFTH STEP
the confidential affairs of Twelve Step Groups. Compulsory dis-
closure of confidential Fifth Step admissions of wrongdoing made
in meetings or under confidential conditions outside of meeting
invade the members' First Amendment liberties.
Consequently, a confidential communications privilege for
Twelve Step Groups that is rooted in the rights of personal
autonomy, confidentiality of personal information, and freedom
of association has a much stronger base than does the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. Confidential communications be-
tween psychotherapist and patient pertain to a secular, non-
spiritual topic, the patient's mental health. Confidential com-
munications in Twelve Step programs pertain to the member's
spiritual discipline.
CONCLUSION
The failure of the Cox and the Boobar courts to recognize a
confidential communications privilege for Twelve Step members
was likely due to the general unfamiliarity with the internal op-
erating processes of Twelve Step Groups. Because Twelve Step
programs lack leaders who possess clergy status or publicly rati-
fied credentials such as licenses, examinations, or degrees, ju-
rists may be reluctant to extend privileged communication status
to such groups. Privileges are not favored by the law because
they are perceived as obstacles to full disclosure of the truth and
to a just resolution of dispute settlement. Although privileged
communications statutes and rules are frequently passed by
legislatures, judges are loath to create a new privilege where
none existed before, or to extend an existing privilege rule be-
yond its narrow limits. Of course, any state legislature is free to
do so by adding a privilege statute to the state's body of statutory
law. The Appendix is a suggested statute of a court rule recog-
nizing a privilege for Twelve Step Group members.
The social ramifications of compulsory disclosure of confi-
dential communications among AA members, however, provide
compelling arguments in favor of the adoption of such privilege.
The principle of anonymity in Twelve Step programs would be
jeopardized, and with it the eventual spiritual wellness of all
present and future members. Members frequently speak at AA
meetings at events that amount to confessions of guilt relating to
criminal activity. They admit actionable civil wrongs, such as
adultery, fraud, and child neglect that would affect their charac-
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ter, fitness for custody and visitation rights in marital dissolu-
tion proceedings. They also admit actions that would cost them
their jobs. The same observation can be made about the sharing
at Al-Anon meetings. Anonymity permits members to take the
Fifth Step; to confess their defects of character and get on with
life and recovery. It is this recovery that puts an end to the so-
cially unacceptable or even criminal behavior that government
seeks to eliminate. Anonymity cannot survive in a climate of
compulsory disclosure. If Twelve Step Groups do not enjoy a
confidential communications privilege, there is nothing to pre-
vent the police from sending "moles" to AA, Narcotics Anony-
mous, and Al-Anon meetings to identify present and former drug
dealers, spousal abusers or bad check artists in order to obtain
incriminating information from meetings. Such moles could pose
as experienced members willing to be sponsors for newcomers to
gain new members' confidence. Such infiltration could have oc-
curred in the case of Paul Cox.
Although a trial judge is free to rule that confidential com-
munications among Twelve Step Group members are privileged
by analogy to existing case law, the likelihood of a trial judge or
an appellate judge doing so is extremely low. Only a judge who
was a member of a Twelve Step Group herself would understand
the compelling necessity for such a privilege. Further, new
privilege rules generally come from the legislature or from the
general rule making process of the court of last resort in the ju-
risdiction.
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APPENDIX
TWELVE STEP GROUP MEMBER'S PRILEGE
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule [act]:
(1) A "T velve Step Group member" is any person affiliated with
Alcoholics Anonymous or a fellowship that has officially re-
ceived permission to use the Twelve Steps and Twelve Tradi-
tions of Alcoholics Anonymous from Alcoholics Anonymous
World Service Organization such as Al-Anon, A-Ateen, Narcot-
ics Anonymous, Narc-Anon, Overeaters Anonymous, Sex Ad-
dicts Anonymous or other like fellowships, or an individual rea-
sonably believed to be so affiliated by the person consulting the
individual.
(2) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not
intended for further disclosure except to other Twelve Step
Group members in furtherance of the purposes of the communi-
cation.
(b) General Privilege Rule. A person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential
communication by the person to a member of a Twelve Step
Group when the person or the fellow member are participating
in a group meeting or the fellow member is acting in the capacity
of spiritual advisor.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The person, the person's
guardian, conservator or personal representative, if deceased,
may claim the privilege. The fellow member who received the
communication has the authority to claim the privilege
provisionally on behalf of the person who made the
communication.
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